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BARGAINING WITH
CONSEQUENCES: LEVERAGE AND
COERCION IN NEGOTIATION
Paul F. Kirgis*
ABSTRACT
Leverage has been called “negotiation’s prime mover,” conferring
power to reach agreement “on your terms.” This power, however, is
not always benign. When a negotiator has sufficient power to compel a
counterparty to accept a set of unfavorable terms, the use of leverage
may cross a line into inappropriate or illegal coercion. While coercion
has been the subject of rich philosophical investigation, the topic of
coercive power has received only cursory treatment in the negotiation
literature. This article seeks to fill that gap by analyzing the uses and
limits of negotiating leverage, which I define as power rooted in
consequences. I identify two types of leverage—positive and negative—
and explore the legal and ethical implications of each type, drawing on
the political theory of coercion as well as primary and secondary legal
sources. I conclude by analyzing the contract doctrines of duress and
unconscionability to show how an understanding of leverage can aid in
the application of legal rules.

I. INTRODUCTION
During the acrimonious federal budget battles of 2013, House
Republicans sought to pressure President Barack Obama and Senate
Democrats to accede to Republican legislative demands by threatening to
block an increase in the federal debt limit—a legislative step necessary for

* Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law, and Faculty Chair, Hugh L. Carey
Center for Dispute Resolution. I am grateful to Ran Kuttner, Mark Movsesian, Michael
Perino, Brian Tamanaha, Stephen Ware, Michael Wheeler, and the participants in the ADR
Works-in-Progress Conference at the University of Oregon School of Law for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article.
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the government to continue meeting its financial obligations.1 Initially,
Republicans demanded equivalent spending cuts in exchange for an
increase in the debt limit; later they turned their attention to the President’s
signature health care law, threatening to deny an increase in the
government’s borrowing authority unless the President and Senate
Democrats agreed to defund the Affordable Health Care Act.2 During an
earlier round of negotiations in the summer of 2011, Democrats had agreed
to accept equivalent spending cuts in exchange for an increase in the debt
limit.3 Congressional Republicans considered the debt ceiling to be an
effective and a legitimate source of bargaining power. Speaker of the
House John Boehner reportedly told President Barack Obama that
“everything you want in life comes with a price,” suggesting that he viewed
a further increase in the debt ceiling as an item of exchange that
Republicans could withhold or concede as part of a rational and fair
negotiation process.4
President Obama responded to the Republicans’ invocation of the
debt-ceiling by charging them with violating a negotiation norm. With
widespread news coverage predicting dire economic and fiscal
consequences if the United States were to default on it obligations,5 Obama
declared that “the financial well-being of the American people is not
leverage to be used.”6 He explicitly rejected the proposition that the debt
ceiling was a legitimate item of exchange: “The full faith and credit of the
1. See Michael D. Shear & Jackie Calmes, Lawmakers Gird for Next Clash, on the
Debt Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, at A1. Without increasing the debt limit, the
government would be able to meet its legislatively-enacted spending obligations, as it is
required by law to do. For several decades, The House of Representatives had automatically
produced a resolution changing the debt limit by the amount recommended in the budget
resolution for the next year, so that the government always had the authority to borrow the
money necessary to pay for the spending Congress authorized. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEBT LIMIT: DELAYS CREATE DEBT MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
AND INCREASE UNCERTAINTY IN THE TREASURY MARKET (Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11203.pdf.
2. See Zachary A. Goldfarb, Lawmakers at Odds Over Federal Borrowing Limit,
WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2013, at A4; Peter Baker, Obama Scorns G.O.P. “Blackmail” on
Health Law, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 27, 2013, at A14.
3. Id.
4. Shear & Calmes, supra note 1, at A1. Senator Mitch McConnell characterized the
debt-ceiling tactic as a legitimate form of leverage in an appearance on “Face the Nation”:
“We have to use whatever leverage we have. And there are some examples of leverage
coming along. The debt ceiling is one of them that hopefully would get the president
engaged.” William Saletan, The G.O.P.’s Empty Threats, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2013, at 15.
5. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Debt Ceiling Rises Again as Threat for U.S., NEW
YORK TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at B1.
6. Jackie Calmes & Jonathan Weisman, Obama and G.O.P. Issue Challenges for
Their Conflicting Views on the Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, January 15, 2013, at A15 (emphasis
added).
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United States of America is not a bargaining chip.”7 The President equated
the invocation of the debt ceiling with a criminal threat and refused to
bargain over it, vowing that House Republicans “will not collect a ransom
in exchange for not crashing the American economy.”8
Though President Obama employed “leverage” as an epithet, not all
applications of leverage in negotiation are illegitimate. Indeed, leverage is
often described as “negotiation’s prime mover,”9 praised for conferring the
“power not just to reach agreement, but to obtain an agreement on your
own terms.”10 Why was the President able to credibly argue that the
Republican strategy had crossed a line from legitimate bargaining to
illegitimate “ransom”?11 What about the Republicans’ invocation of the
debt ceiling made it an inappropriate (in the eyes of the President) exercise
of “leverage”?
In common parlance, leverage is a synonym for power. Power,
however, is a broad and amorphous concept. Robert Dahl, a leading
theorist on political power, defines power in these terms: “A has power
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not
otherwise do.”12 Power in negotiation may similarly be understood as the
ability to affect favorably someone else’s decisions.13 Negotiating power
can take many different forms, including status, knowledge and
information, organizational control, personal charisma, and superior

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., H. Lee Hetherington, Negotiating Lessons from Iran: Synthesizing
Langdell & MacCrate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 680 (1995).
10. G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR
REASONABLE PEOPLE 90 (2d ed. 2006).
11. President Obama was not alone in his reaction to the Republicans’ debt ceiling
strategy. See Ruth Marcus, Which party will blink? WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2013, at A15
(“Administration officials point to warnings from former House speaker Newt Gingrich
about using the debt ceiling as a negotiating tactic. They note that McConnell shied away
from repeating debt-ceiling threats, and that House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), in an
interview with the Wall Street Journal, described the debt ceiling as ‘not the ultimate
leverage.’”); Shear & Calmes, supra note 1, at A1 (quoting David M. Cote, chairman of
Honeywell and a Republican member of the 2010 Simpson-Bowles fiscal commission,
saying that “[t]he whole idea of using debt ceiling that way or saying ‘I’ll do this horrible
thing to all of us unless you give in’ just doesn’t make any sense for anybody.”); Robert M.
Solow, Our Debt, Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013, at A29.
12. Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI 201–15 (1957), reprinted in
POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 80 (Roderick Bell et al., eds. 1969)
(collecting essays on the nature of power).
13. See Roger Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 149 (1983), as reprinted in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 127, 128 (J.
William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds. 1991).
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alternatives.14 Leverage is best understood as a subset of power, and like
other sources of power, may be used legitimately or illegitimately.
I use the term leverage to refer to a specific type of power: power
rooted in consequences. That is, a party has leverage when it has the ability
to influence another party through the threat of or the imposition of
consequences on that party. Leverage is distinct from other sources of
power, which derive their force from either psychological processes or
social norms such as moral principle, charisma, or rank. Leverage
encompasses all forms of power based on a party’s ability to confer
material benefits or impose material costs on a counterparty. President
Obama appears to have used leverage in this sense when he chastised
House Republicans. The President objected to the use of the debt ceiling as
a “bargaining chip,” meaning, as a benefit to be conferred or a cost to be
imposed.
My goal in this article is to explore the use and abuse of leverage—
defined as power rooted in consequences—in negotiation. A key ingredient
in this effort is the concept of coercion.15 The ability to impose
consequences on a counterparty entails the potential to coerce. Negotiators
often feel that they have “no choice” but to agree to a particular deal, either
because they have no good alternatives or because the alternative, not
agreeing, is too high. By linking leverage and ransom, President Obama
suggested House Republicans were attempting to hold him, and the
government, hostage. The President claimed that Republicans sought to
coerce rather than bargain in good faith. But not every exercise of leverage

14. See id. at 130. Roger Fisher, an original proponent of principled negotiation,
identifies six categories of power: emphasizing skill and knowledge, good relationships,
good alternatives, elegant solutions, legitimacy, and commitment. On the opposite end of
the philosophical spectrum, “power negotiating” guru Roger Dawson argues that power
comes not primarily from principle, but from status, the ability to reward or coerce,
charisma, organizational control over a situation, and information. See ROGER DAWSON,
SECRETS OF POWER NEGOTIATING 253–82 (2d ed. 2001). Robert Adler and Elliot Silverstein
distill those same concepts into four sources of power: personal power, organizational
power, information power, and moral power. See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein,
When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 23–28 (2000). Adler and Silverstein define personal power as “inherent
individual traits that a person brings to a negotiation not directly associated with his or her
organizational status;” organizational power as “the formal power of a given position and []
the actual control a position has within an organization;” information power as the expertise
or research that allow a negotiator to “see the context of a given situation clearly and
respond accordingly;” and moral power as the ability to “achieve gains through appeals to
fairness or morality.” Id. at 23–24.
15. See Peter Westen, “Freedom” and “Coercion”: Virtue Words and Vice Words,
1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 560. Westen refers to coercion in terms almost identical to those used
by Fisher and Dawson to define power: “Coercion is an interpersonal relation in which one
person affects the behavior of another.”
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in negotiation crosses a moral or legal line. Understanding the moral and
legal limits on leverage in negotiation requires understanding the social
norms surrounding coercion.16
In this article, I rely on philosophical literature on coercion to distill
the normative criteria used to judge the coerciveness of a proposal. Then I
connect those insights with negotiation theory and the legal doctrines
governing contract formation and avoidance to analyze leverage and its
limits in negotiation. I contend that our moral intuitions about coercion can
be elucidated by exploring the understanding of leverage that emerges from
negotiation theory. I offer a framework for understanding the different
forms of leverage and their relative degrees of coerciveness. Finally, I show
how these considerations appear in the judicial treatment of negotiation
practices through the contract doctrines of duress and unconscionability.
Central to this analysis is a distinction I draw between two forms of
leverage, described by Richard Shell as “positive leverage” and “negative
leverage.”17 Positive leverage derives from a party’s ability to satisfy the
counterparty’s interests. For example, the logrolling that is a routine, if
often lamented, part of the legislative process rests on positive leverage.18
Legislators bargain to satisfy each others’ interests, trading votes on
matters of less importance to them in exchange for other members’ votes
on matters of greater importance. The strength of their leverage depends on
the value of what they have to offer, measured against the value to them of
what the other side offers to trade.
Negative leverage is derived from a party’s ability to impose costs on
the counterparty if the counterparty refuses to agree to a set of terms. When
President Obama implied that House Republicans were engaged in
16. The topic of coercive power has received surprisingly little consideration in the
negotiation literature, even in work that deals explicitly with power. Roger Fisher never
assesses coercive tactics such as threats at all, and even Roger Dawson spends only a few
pages discussing “coercive power,” which he defines as the power to punish. See Dawson,
supra note at 264-68. The scholarly literature is no more fulsome, with virtually no work
devoted to retributive or overtly coercive power. See, e.g., Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on
Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 325. Goodpaster discusses most of the same
competitive tactics described by Dawson, and offers only one small paragraph on threats.
Other analyses focus almost entirely on the power that comes from having better
alternatives than the counterparty. That is the focus, for example, of Daniel Barnhizer’s
extensive treatment of inequality of bargaining power and Russell Korobkin’s more cursory
analysis of bargaining power as threat of impasse. See generally Daniel D. Barnhizer,
Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005); Russell Korobkin,
Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 867 (2004).
17. See SHELL, supra note 10, at 101.
18. See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1339 (2000). A number
of states have tried to curb logrolling through “single subject” rules that require the
legislature to confine all acts to a single subject. See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject
Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 805 (2006).
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extortion, he was suggesting that they were improperly using negative
leverage. He argued that Congress had an existing obligation to pay the
debts it incurred—which it could not do without raising the debt limit—and
that the failure to pay those debts would impose unacceptable costs on the
country. House Republicans were threatening to impose a cost, one that
would entail considerable harm to their own governing interests,19 if the
President did not agree to the spending cuts.
Part II begins with an analysis of the philosophical literature on
coercion, focusing on the work of Robert Nozick and Peter Westen. Part III
details the distinction between positive and negative leverage, and shows
how negative leverage, unlike positive leverage, carries coercive force.
This section also demonstrates that positive leverage is not always used for
good, nor is negative leverage always used for evil. Part IV analyzes
contract doctrine in light of the theory of leverage, and explains how this
theory can shed light on courts’ grounds for relieving parties of their
contractual obligations. Although they do not speak in terms of positive
and negative leverage, in practice, courts give greater scrutiny to
bargaining practices employing negative leverage than to those employing
positive leverage. I argue, as a prescriptive matter, that understanding the
positive and negative leverage in the bargaining processes can help courts
to apply the doctrines of duress and unconscionability in more consistent
and rational ways. Abuses of negative leverage ought to be understood as
grounds for contract unenforceability under the principle of duress, while
abuses of positive leverage should be understood as grounds for contract
unenforceability under the principle of unconscionability.
Although the theory of leverage I offer has implications for a variety of
negotiation and legal contexts,20 I focus on a relatively narrow set of issues.
Leverage plays a role in almost all negotiations. Social attitudes about the
appropriateness of various applications of leverage differ widely across
those contexts. This article does not attempt to grapple with all the
ramifications this theory entails. Instead, it represents an initial effort to

19. If the United States were to default, its credit rating would worsen, raising its
borrowing costs and exacerbating federal budget deficits. See Robert M. Solow, Our Debt,
Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013, at A29.
20. To give just one example, questions about coercion and duress often arise in the
criminal law. Duress is a defense to a criminal charge; in such a case, an accused has carried
out a criminal act, but asserts duress as a reason to avoid punishment. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.09 (providing that duress is an excuse for criminal activity when “a person of
reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”). I focus on the
related but distinct question of duress as a contract defense; in this situation, a contracting
party has made a commitment to carry out a legal act, but asserts duress as a reason to avoid
that commitment. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 152–54 (1987) (contrasting criminal
defense of duress and contract defense of duress).
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formulate a theory of leverage and demonstrate its utility in commercial
disputes, such as arms-length transactions in which a weaker party seeks to
escape contractual obligations on grounds of duress or unconscionability.
II. COERCION AND THE SOCIAL NORMS LIMITING LEVERAGE IN
NEGOTIATION
Within the Western socio-political tradition, coercion is considered a
social evil.21 In the terminology of Peter Westen, “coercion” is a vice
word—a word that conveys a derogatory normative judgment.22 It is
contrasted with “freedom,” a virtue word conveying a positive normative
judgment. Our federal and state constitutions exist in large measure to limit
governmental coercion and promote individual freedom of action. A
variety of criminal and civil laws proscribe coercion or excuse actions
coerced by others in the private sphere. Chief among them are laws
prohibiting extortion, the defense of duress to criminal or civil liability,23
and contract doctrines offering relief from agreements on grounds of duress
and unconscionability.24
If coercion is a social evil, it is a subtle one. Coercion involves a
paradox: coercion is an evil because it robs a person of her freedom of
action, yet coercion exists only when the coerced person acts under her
own volition.25 For example, I coerce a person if I threaten to break her
arm unless she gives me her money; I do not coerce her if I forcibly remove
her wallet from her possession.26 The difference between the two is that in
the first case, the success of my venture depends on her taking a volitional
action to give me her money. Even if volitional, however, her action
arguably is not voluntary. In the lexicon of The Godfather, I made her an
offer she could not refuse.27

21. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 4 (“The general assumption is that promises
are binding, rights can be waived, and punishment appropriately applied if, but only if, the
relevant actions are voluntary.”).
22. See Westen, supra note 15, at 547–48.
23. See generally John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L.
REV. 275 (1999).
24. See infra Section IV.
25. See Hill, supra note 23, at 286–87.
26. See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440, 440
(Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (“If I lure you into an escape-proof room in New
York and leave you imprisoned there, I do not coerce you into not going to Chicago though
I make you unfree to do it.”).
27. Alan Wertheimer refers to this condition as “constrained volition.” See
WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 9. Wertheimer also explains the different ways of
understanding “choice,” and what we mean when we say a person has “no choice” but to
take some action. Id. at 192–201.
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Complicating the concept of coercion is the distinction between
threats, predictions, and warnings.28 Coercion implies that the party
making the proposal has the power to carry out the proposed course of
action. For example, if a negative turn of events is likely to happen as a
natural consequence of a counterparty’s action, and I tell the counterparty
that he can avoid the consequence by refraining from the action, and he
does refrain from the action, I have not coerced him.29 Rather, I have made
a prediction or a warning. Coercion requires more than this. It requires that
I have the ability (or apparent ability) to cause the negative consequence,
that my counterparty understands this, and that my counterparty declines to
take an action he would otherwise take in order to avoid the consequence.30
Coercion claims rest on two related moral duties tied to the value of
liberty: First, the moral duty not to take advantage of another’s
vulnerability to override that person’s will (this is a violation of the Kantian
maxim not to use others as a means to one’s own ends);31 and second, the
moral duty not to harm.32 All coercion involves the violation of both these
principles, albeit in particular ways that make the definitional endeavor so
taxing.

28. See Hill, supra note 23, at 292–96 (critiquing theories distinguishing threats from
offers). The typical formulation posits that threats promise to make the recipient worse off
than he would otherwise be in relation to some baseline (often the recipient’s expectations),
while offers promise to make the recipient better off than he would otherwise be in relation
that baseline. See Westen, supra note 15, at 571–73; WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 204–
11; Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals, 4 POLITICAL THEORY 65, 66 (1976) (“Threats worsen
your position compared to what you can expect, whereas (non-coercive) offers do not.”).
Expectations also seem to play a key role in Kent Greenawalt’s definition of manipulative
threats. Greenawalt argues that threats are illegally coercive only if they are “situationaltering,” by which he means the threatened action is not what would take place in the
“normal” (expected?) course of events. See Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and
Freedom of Speech, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1081 (1983).
I avoid this semantic tangle by focusing not on whether a proposal is a threat or an offer, but
on whether it satisfies either party’s interests.
29. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 453 (1974).
30. See Westen, supra note 15, at 569. Westen defines coercion as:
A constraint or promise of constraint, Y, that X[1] knowingly brings to bear on X in order
that X choose to do something, Z[1], that X would not otherwise do and that X does not wish
to be constrained to do, where X knows that X[1] is bringing or promising to bring Y to bear
on him for that purpose, and where the constraint renders X’s doing Z[1] more eligible to X
than it would otherwise be.
31. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 (Mary
Gregor ed. & trans., 1998) (“[A]ct that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”).
32. See Haksar, supra note 28, at 69 (“[F]or a proposal to be coercive, it is necessary
that the proposal should involve a wrong to the recipient.”).
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A. Nozick on Coercion and Free Will
As detailed above, coercion is normally considered a social evil, in
part, because it renders actions that appear to be volitional involuntary. It
violates norms favoring freedom of the will.33 The difficulty is that we
impair each other’s freedom of action all the time. Every action we take
changes the world, and as a consequence, constricts the range of possible
actions for others. To understand the social limits on leverage in
negotiation, we need a way to distinguish inappropriate infringements on
others’ freedom of action from mundane and unobjectionable consequential
actions of daily life.34
Robert Nozick addresses this dilemma with his theory of voluntary
exchange. This theory distinguishes between facts of nature and willful acts
of others. A person’s actions are voluntary if limited by facts of nature. For
example, I cannot fly due to physical laws, but this does not render my
decision to walk involuntary.35 On the other hand, if another person takes
an action that limits my options, whether my decision is voluntary or
involuntary depends on whether the other person had the right to act as he
did. An action is voluntary even if constrained by another person so long as
the other person had the right to act in the way she did.36 When a person
makes the choice between accepting a particular job at a particular wage or
starving, his choice is voluntary as long as all the other people whose
actions resulted in that constraint were acting within their rights.37
Nozick’s approach to voluntariness raises the question of what it
means to “act within one’s rights.” Clearly a person does not act within his
rights if he engages in illegal conduct, such as physical violence. But that is
not typical. Coercion usually involves more subtle means, and often the
threatened conduct would be legal examined apart from the context. This is
the “paradox of blackmail.” In the words of James Lindgren, “[i]n
33. These norms have deep roots in the western tradition. In the Nichomacean Ethics,
Aristotle took pains to distinguish voluntary from involuntary actions for purposes of
defining virtue: “On some actions praise indeed is not bestowed, but pardon is, when one
does what he ought not under pressure which overstrains human nature and which no one
could withstand.” Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 349, 349
(Richard McKeon ed., 1947).
34. See Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535, 1557
(1996) (analyzing Kant’s theory of rights and duties) (“Any obligation that a person bears
must be presented as part of a system of mutual respect among all persons, not merely as an
artifact of one person’s demands. People are entitled to assume in the state of nature that
their external freedom will be limited only to the extent necessary to harmonize their
freedom with that of everyone else in accordance with a universal law . . . .”).
35. See NOZICK, supra note 29, at 262.
36. See also WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 217.
37. See NOZICK, supra note 29, at 262.
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blackmail, the heart of the problem is that two separate acts, each of which
is a moral and legal right, can combine to make a moral and legal
wrong.”38 Asking someone for money is not wrong; telling the police that a
crime has been committed is also not wrong. But threatening to tell the
police that a crime has been committed, while asking for money, is a
crime.39
Nozick articulates a theory of “productive activities” that helps to
resolve this conundrum. For Nozick, the central problem with blackmail is
that it is not a productive activity. Productive activities are “those that make
purchasers better off than if the seller had nothing at all to do with them.”40
If one party pays another not to harm him, there has not been a productive
exchange. Blackmail is unproductive because the purchaser (the person
being blackmailed) is not made better off after the transaction than he
would have been had the blackmailer never entered his life.41
Voluntary exchanges occur where both parties are the recipients of
productive activities. But there is an important caveat. Nozick considers an
exchange voluntary even though it does not confer a net benefit on the
purchaser if the purchaser is compensating the seller for forgoing a
productive exchange with a third party.42 So, if a writer is offered money
by a publisher to publish a book containing damaging secrets about A, A’s
payment to the writer to forgo publishing the damaging secrets “counts” as
a productive, and hence voluntary, exchange. But the seller of silence may
“legitimately charge only what he forgoes by silence,” and “[w]hat he
forgoes does not include the payment he could have received to abstain
from revealing his information, though it does include the payments others
would make to him to reveal the information.”43 In other words, he cannot
demand more than the actual loss to him from forgoing publication.44

38. James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670,
670 (1984).
39. Id.
40. NOZICK, supra note 29, at 84 (emphasis in original).
41. Id. Nozick notes an exception for cases in which the paying party deserves to be
harmed by the other. Cf. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1935, 1962 (1993) (arguing that blackmail threatening to disclose criminality might
confer overall economic benefits to society by deterring crime).
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id. at 85.
44. James Lindgren criticizes Nozick’s theory as failing to account for certain types of
exchanges that do not constitute blackmail but seem to be unproductive in Nozick’s terms.
Lindgren uses the example of a person injured by a falling tree who threatens to sue the
property owner where the tree stood unless paid compensation. See Lindgren, supra note 38,
at 699. But that is precisely the case Nozick accounts for by saying a party can fairly ask to
be compensated for forgoing an activity that would benefit him. The injured passerby has
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Nozick’s theory of voluntary exchange suggests an important
distinction between forms and uses of leverage. When a negotiator employs
the leverage that comes from her ability to satisfy the other party’s interests
or from her willingness to pursue an alternative means of satisfying the
negotiator’s interests, she is engaged in productive activity in Nozick’s
formulation. As long as the negotiator proposes to pursue only alternatives
that genuinely satisfy her interests, then the most she can request (in the
sense of the maximum force her leverage has) is to be compensated for
forgoing those alternatives.45 She is acting within her rights. So imagine
that A, a homeowner, is concerned that her neighbor B’s dog will enter her
property and damage something of value. A can solve the problem by
putting up a fence, or B can address the problem by leashing the dog. A
says to B, “I’m planning to put up a fence, but I’ll hold off if you agree to
leash your dog.” B wants neither option to come to pass. To the extent A is
proposing to put up a fence that satisfies her interests, however, she is
proposing a voluntary exchange.
On the other hand, an involuntary exchange occurs when a party
proposes to impose costs on the counterparty for pursuing the
counterparty’s alternatives, through actions that do not satisfy the party’s
interests. What the party proposes to forgo in such a case is not something
that entitles him to compensation. If A proposes to build an unnecessarily
high and unattractive fence (one that even she does not desire), she has no
right to be compensated for forgoing that fence. A is not acting within her
rights, and so, she is not proposing a voluntary exchange. She is attempting
to coerce B.46
Nozick’s theory of voluntary exchange provides a valuable starting
point for identifying negotiating behaviors that are coercive. However,
more work needs to be done to explicate the social norms that regulate
leverage in negotiation. Some proposals are morally unacceptable though
they result in productive activity in Nozick’s sense. By the same token,
some proposals that impose costs on a counterparty without satisfying the
proposer’s interests are morally acceptable. Nozick does not fully account
for these apparent anomalies.47
the right to sue for his injuries, and is merely offering to forego that right in exchange for
fair compensation.
45. Wertheimer seems to have a similar conception in mind with his focus on whether
the offeror had a preexisting plan to engage in the conduct proposed; that would suggest that
the proposal would satisfy the offeror’s interests. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 220.
46. Ronal Coase suggests that coercion of this type is equivalent to blackmail. See
Ronald Coase, Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 657–58 (1988).
47. See Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472,
478 (1980) (“defining voluntariness in [Nozick’s] way conflicts with deeply entrenched
notions of moral responsibility”).
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B. Westen on the Moral Limits of Coercion
Peter Westen’s attempt to identify the features of a proposal that make
it coercive extends Nozick’s theory to better encompass moral concerns.
Westen attempts to distinguish “threats,” which impose “burdens,” from
“offers,” which confer “benefits.” He distinguishes threats/burdens from
offers/benefits along two axes: the expectations of the parties and the moral
standards of society. We can assess whether a proposal is coercive by
asking what state of affairs the recipient of the proposal would have
expected in the absence of the proposed course of action and what state of
affairs the recipient is entitled to expect given society’s moral standards. To
be coercive, a proposal must leave the recipient “worse off either than he
otherwise expects to be or than he ought to be for refusing to do the
proponent’s bidding.”48 Westen measures the conditions that “ought” to
obtain in terms of legal and moral obligations—in other words, in terms of
social norms.49
Westen’s normative criterion—how a party “ought” to be left—helps
to explain why certain exercises of leverage are considered unacceptable
even though they involve voluntary exchange in Nozick’s sense. For
example, a person in urgent need of medical care but with no insurance and
very little cash appears at a private hospital. The hospital refuses to provide
care unless the person can demonstrate an ability to pay a reasonable fee.
The leverage in this situation arises out of the hospital’s ability to satisfy
the person’s interests. The exchange the hospital proposes is productive in
Nozick’s terms—it would leave the person better off than if the hospital
had never existed. It offers a voluntary exchange, which in Nozick’s terms
is non-coercive. Yet most people in our society would find the refusal to
treat a person in dire need of care morally indefensible.50 In modern
America, there is a broad social consensus that people in need of medical
care “ought” to be cared for, and Westen’s framework accounts for this
kind of situation.
Westen’s descriptive criterion—whether a proposal would leave a
party worse off than she expects—is less well defined. Westen says that we
measure what a party “expects” by reference to some baseline, but he never
explains how that baseline is identified. The baseline must have an

48. Westen, supra note 15, at 587–88 (emphasis in original).
49. Id. at 586.
50. See, e.g., Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd. EMTALA requires hospitals to provide treatment to anyone needing
emergency care regardless of ability to pay. Id. It reflects the broad societal consensus that it
is morally indefensible to refuse medical treatment to a person in severe distress simply
because that person lacks financial resources.
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objective reference point, because people may have radically different and
irrationally self-serving expectations for what they deserve. Westen gives
little guidance on that essential question. I will return to the question of
expectations in discussing the legal limits on leverage in part IV.
C. A Note on Distributive Justice and Leverage in Negotiation
Nozick’s conception of voluntariness rests on a view of social norms
emphasizing liberty and strong notions of private property over other
values. Voluntary exchanges occur when individuals act rationally and
within the legal parameters to satisfy their interests. As scholars of law and
economics persuasively argue, many common-law rules work to promote
wealth-maximization through strong property rights.51 From a legal
standpoint, an emphasis on liberty backed by strong notions of private
property is arguably justified as a descriptive matter.52 As a prescriptive
matter, the libertarian test of voluntariness has elegance and the relatively
straightforward application that characterizes powerful economic
arguments. But many members of our society find the distributive
consequences of the libertarian emphasis on strong private property rights
unacceptable.
In his influential work on distributive justice and contract law,
Anthony Kronman argues that, even for libertarians, contract law should
work to promote distributive justice by limiting the ability of a party to
“take advantage” of others by exploiting “superior information, intellect, or
judgment, in the monopoly he enjoys in regard to a particular resource, or
in his possession of a powerful instrument of violence or a gift for
deception.”53 He offers a “paretian” limiting principle, one that “forbids us
to grant the possessor of an advantage the exclusive right to exploit it for
his own benefit unless those excluded from its ownership are thereby made
better off than they would be if no one were given a greater right to the
advantage than anyone else.”54 By focusing on the welfare of all those
excluded from the advantage, and not just on the individuals involved in a
particular transaction, Kronman seeks to promote overall social welfare.55
His formula requires that “the welfare of most people who are taken

51. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 357–58 (1990).
52. Id. at 359 (“It is probably no accident . . . that many common law doctrines
assumed their modern form in the nineteenth century, when laissez-faire ideology, which
resembles wealth maximization, had a strong hold on the Anglo-American judicial
imagination . . . .”).
53. Kronman, supra note 47, at 480.
54. Id. at 493.
55. See id. at 487.
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advantage of in a particular way be increased by the kind of advantagetaking in question.”56
Kronman’s theory provides a test for assessing whether contract law
promotes distributive justice at a societal level. But contract law operates
on a case-by-case basis as courts interpret and enforce, or decline to
enforce, specific contractual terms. Individual parties likely have little
concern for whether judicial decisions in cases like theirs promote overall
social welfare. They are likely to judge the distributive justice of contract
law in relation to their own cases. Perhaps the best way to determine
whether a minimal threshold of distributive justice has been met in a
particular case is to ensure that basic standards of procedural justice are
enforced. Empirical negotiation research shows that perceptions of
procedural justice contribute directly to perceptions of distributive justice.57
Parties that believe the process has been fair are more likely to be satisfied
with the outcome, and to comply with it, even if the outcome is not
objectively favorable.58 Fortified with the knowledge that parties who
believe the process was just tend to believe their outcomes are
distributively just, advocates of distributive justice may best achieve their
goals by ensuring that contract law promotes procedural justice in
bargaining.
Most procedural justice research focuses on process involving thirdparties, such as mediation, arbitration, and adjudication.59 Recently,
however, several studies of procedural justice in negotiation have been
undertaken.60 They show that many of the same factors parties in thirdparty processes use to assess procedural fairness also apply in negotiation.
Specifically, parties in negotiation judge the process to be just when they
feel they have been able to express themselves, believe they can trust the
other party, and feel they have been treated with courtesy and respect.61
The relative absence of rules governing these features of negotiation in
the rules of professional conduct for lawyers is evidence of our social

56.
57.

Id. at 487 (emphasis in original).
See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 205 (1988); see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 381, 388 (2010); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ.
L. REV. 753, 761 (2004).
58. See E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using
Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 224 (1993); JOHN
THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 73–74
(1975).
59. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s
Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 792–93 (2001).
60. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 57, at 413.
61. See id. at 418.
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reticence to police negotiations to ensure that procedural justice is
delivered.62 The marketplace is expected to regulate procedural justice in
negotiation. There is some evidence that market-based solutions work:
people “punish” negotiators who treat them unjustly by avoiding future
negotiations with those unfair bargainers.63
Contract law promotes procedural justice, and in so doing helps
promote distributive justice, by regulating coercion. Coercion undermines
the trust and perception of respect essential for parties to feel they have
received procedural justice. While it is true that a test for coercion rooted in
a libertarian understanding of voluntariness fails to capture all the factors
contributing to distributive and procedural justice, we are unlikely to find a
more fulsome test that would work in practice. My modest goal is to
identify workable legal standards for assessing exercises of leverage in
negotiation to ensure that parties are neither coerced nor taken advantage of
in ways that violate basic social norms. As I argue in the next section,
Nozick’s libertarian voluntariness principle, as modified by Westen’s
addition of criteria accounting for non-libertarian views of distributive
justice, can effectively ground that effort.
III. LEVERAGE AND THE STRUCTURE OF NEGOTIATION
The philosophical literature on coercion offers important insight into
the circumstances in which proposed exchanges are perceived as
inappropriately coercive. Proposals suggesting a voluntary exchange are
presumptively not coercive. They may violate norms against overreaching ,
however, if they leave a party in a position worse than it ought to be in or
should reasonably expect to be in. Proposals threatening an action that is
not productive are presumptively coercive. They may be acceptable if they
would leave a party in a position that it ought to be in or reasonably should
expect to be in.
The distinction that Nozick draws between productive and
unproductive activities suggests a distinction between two different types
of leverage. Leverage that operates through the satisfaction of interests, and
therefore proposes a voluntary exchange, is normatively different from
leverage that operates through the imposition of costs without benefit to
either party. Richard Shell seems to have had a similar distinction in mind
with his categories of “positive” and “negative” leverage.64 In Shell’s
62. See id. at 401–02 (“The rules for negotiation are few and far between, and difficult
to enforce.”).
63. See id. at 415.
64. See SHELL, supra note 10, at 101–05. Shell actually identifies three types of
leverage: positive, negative, and normative. Normative leverage, in Shell’s formulation,
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formulation, positive leverage comes from knowledge of the other side’s
interests and the ability to satisfy them.65 Negative leverage involves
threats to take away something the other party has.66
In this section, I use this basic distinction to explore the concept of
leverage from the perspective of negotiation theory. I offer definitions of
positive and negative leverage that rest on Nozick’s distinction. Although I
cannot be certain that I have precisely the same understanding of these
terms as Shell,67 I retain Shell’s terminology because I believe it captures
an important conceptual distinction between leverage tied to the
satisfaction of interests (positive) and leverage tied to the imposition of
costs (negative). I then draw on Westen’s criteria to analyze cases in which
positive leverage is inappropriate and, conversely, cases in which negative
leverage is appropriate.
A. The Structure of Negotiation
Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton showed how the
intersecting concepts of interests and alternatives help to explain

derives from the invocation of norms or criteria that the other party feels constrained to
accept. Id. at 44. Normative leverage arises out of social norms and utilizes principled
argument. A negotiator uses normative leverage, for example, when she makes a reasoned
argument for why her position is fair under accepted social norms. The pressure her
counterparty feels in that situation is rooted in the counterparty’s own sense of moral
obligation, backed by social expectations.
By defining leverage as power rooted in consequences, I exclude the pressure created by
social expectations from the category of leverage. The pressure of normative leverage is
generated internally, deriving from an individual’s need to conform his behavior to his
perceptions of himself. It is not a product of the imposition or threat of imposition of
consequences generated externally by the negotiating partner. As such, it raises very
different legal and ethical issues from those raised by consequential leverage. An
application of normative leverage will either succeed or fail, depending on the social force
of the norms invoked and the degree to which the counterparty subscribes to those norms.
But outside of the potential for misrepresentation, the use of normative leverage rarely
carries the risk of legal or ethical sanction. In contrast, when parties impose or threaten to
impose consequences on other parties, their actions can trigger a variety of legal and ethical
considerations, from extortion to duress to unconscionability, as well as uncovering more
subtle moral dilemmas. For these reasons, I exclude normative factors from the category of
leverage, and focus entirely on leverage rooted in consequences.
65. See id. at 102.
66. See id. at 102–03.
67. There may be areas in which our uses of these terms do not quite match. For
example, Shell refers to negative leverage as “threat-based” leverage tied to taking away
something the other side has. See SHELL, supra note 10, at 102. As I define negative
leverage, however, it does not necessarily involve taking something away that the other side
already has. More often it involves the threat to impose a future cost on the other side for
pursuing its alternatives to a negotiated agreement.
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negotiation in their groundbreaking book Getting to Yes.68 Interests–our
needs, desires, concerns, and fears–are what motivate us.69 Interests can
involve material goods as well as intangible goods, from the bare
necessities of food and shelter to luxury and leisure items, to dignity, love,
and status.70 In non-state societies, people often use violence to satisfy their
interests. They acquire both material and psychological goods by raiding
neighboring peoples.71 In market-based, liberal societies, people are likely
to satisfy their interests through exchange. People negotiate trades in which
they give things of value to others in exchange for things they value.
Some interests are non-negotiable, however, in the sense that they are
not available for trade. For example, human beings have deep-seated needs
for recognition and respect. Recognition and respect are conditions for
negotiation; they are rarely subjects of negotiation. When I agree to
negotiate with someone, I implicitly recognize that person’s autonomy and
worth. When I offer someone money or threaten a person with harm, I may
be able to procure acquiescence or even subservience, but I can never know
whether I have actually gained respect.72
Those sorts of non-negotiable psychological interests have undeniable
importance. They can be powerful motivators of human behavior,73
conferring a different type of leverage than the material interests that are
the subject of exchange. When Nozick refers to productive activities
leading to voluntary exchange, he refers to trades of negotiable goods. The
interests that a negotiator proposes to satisfy or to forego in a voluntary
exchange must be interests for which the negotiator can be compensated by
the counterparty. Normally, these will be material interests. Proposals that
satisfy either the offeror’s or the offeree’s compensable, material interests
are normally not coercive.
By identifying and ranking interests (whether available in trade or not),
a potential negotiator can make rational choices about the various
alternative courses of action open to him. The negotiator begins by
identifying the courses of action available to satisfy his interests. The
alternative course of action that best satisfies the negotiator’s interests is his
68. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 100 (2d ed. 1991).
69. See id. at 40–41.
70. For an early attempt to map out a hierarchy of basic human needs, see generally
Abraham H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370 (1943).
71. See STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS
DECLINED 46–47 (2011).
72. See Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 756 (2001).
73. See ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU
NEGOTIATE 15 (2005) (describing “core concerns,” including appreciation, affiliation,
autonomy, status, and role, that motivate negotiators).
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“best alternative to a negotiated agreement,” or “BATNA.” A negotiator’s
BATNA is the alternative the negotiator would resort to if he fails to reach
agreement with the other party to the negotiation. For example, if I am
considering purchasing a house, my alternatives include all the other
options I have for finding a residence. Those alternatives might include
staying in my current residence, purchasing any of several other houses, or
renting. I identify my best alternative by prioritizing my interests—cost,
location, size, amenities, etc.—and assessing the alternatives to find the one
that best satisfies my interests.
After identifying a BATNA, a negotiator can then attempt to determine
a “reservation point” (RP), which is the point at which the negotiator
should walk away from the table rather than reaching agreement.74 In the
home-buying scenario, my reservation point is the value (or cost) to me of
the best alternative living arrangement available to me. If a comparable
home to the one I am considering is available for $250,000, I would not
want to spend more than that on the one I am considering.75 My reservation
point is $250,000. Reservation point is thus roughly equivalent to a
“bottom line.” It represents the point at which a proposed agreement better
satisfies my interests than my best alternative to that agreement.76
Rational negotiators should prepare for a negotiation by identifying
their BATNAs and then determining their reservation points based on those
BATNAs.77 They should also attempt to estimate the other side’s
reservation point. In a negotiation in which the parties are sufficiently
adverse to resist complete transparency, much of the bargaining process
consists of attempts to acquire information to locate the other party’s
reservation point, while conveying the impression that a party’s own
reservation point is more favorable than it really is.78 Arguments about the
likelihood of successful litigation, or the availability of a comparable house
at a lower price, represent attempts to persuade the counterparty that a
negotiator has better alternatives than the counterparty has acknowledged.79
Eventually, after exchanging information and arguments about the
74. See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789,
1791–92 (2000).
75. I assume for purposes of simplicity that the two homes satisfy all my nonmonetary interests identically.
76. Because non-quantifiable interests often trump quantifiable interests, reservation
points are rarely susceptible to precise calculation. The concept of a reservation point has
greatest utility in commercial negotiations and other contexts involving trades of
quantifiable items.
77. See ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE
IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 22–23 (2000).
78. See Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1793.
79. See id. at 1799.
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alternatives available to them, the parties gain a sense (which may or may
not be accurate) of the parameters of a possible agreement.
A simple, zero-sum negotiation, such as a negotiation in which sales
price is the only issue, can be visually depicted as a series of points on a
line. The point at the far left represents a price of zero, and the point at the
far right represents the highest possible price. The Buyer’s RP is the price
at which the Buyer could purchase the item from an alternative source, and
the Seller’s RP is the price the Seller could obtain from an alternative
buyer. If the Buyer would pay more to obtain the item from an alternative
source than the Seller could obtain from an alternative buyer, then a
positive bargaining zone, sometimes referred to a Zone of Possible
Agreements (ZOPA) exists. This situation can be depicted as follows:
ZOPA
$0

Seller’s
RP

Buyer’s
RP

In such a negotiation, both parties are better off reaching a deal with
each other than they would be going with their alternatives. The Buyer
should be willing to pay some amount above the Seller’s RP and the Seller
should be willing to accept some amount below the Buyer’s RP. They
should be able to reach agreement, provided they can agree on how to
divide the cooperative surplus represented by the ZOPA.80 For instance, in
the home-buying example, if a comparable house is available for $250,000
(my RP) and the seller has only one other potential purchaser, who is
willing to pay no more than $225,000, then a positive ZOPA of $25,000
exists. We should settle on a price somewhere between $225,000 and
$250,000.81
Negotiation involves two conceptually distinct activities. To use the
familiar metaphor, the parties first determine the size and composition of
the pie, then decide how to split it.82 Russell Korobkin labels these the

80. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 18–21.
81. In practice, negotiations always involve both interests and emotions that cannot be
reduced to a point on a line. The diagram is simply a useful model to understand the concept
of cooperative surplus.
82. Other negotiation scholars have used different terminology to capture this same
basic structure. David Lax and James Sebenius, among others, distinguish attempts to create
value from attempts to claim value. DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS
NEGOTIATOR 30–33 (1986). Charles Craver refers to the two steps as the “information stage”
and the “distributive stage.” CHARLES B. CRAVER, SKILLS & VALUES: LEGAL NEGOTIATION
30, 38 (2009).
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“zone-definition” stage and the “surplus allocation” stage.83 In the zonedefinition stage, the parties exchange information and make arguments in
order to determine the zone of possible agreements. Assuming a positive
bargaining zone exists, so both parties are able to offer the other a deal
better than the other’s reservation point, the parties must divide the
resulting cooperative surplus. They make offers and concessions in an
attempt to arrive at a mutually-agreeable deal point.84 The parties might
split the cooperative surplus evenly, or divide it with one party capturing
more than the other. A variety of methods may be employed to allocate the
cooperative surplus, including reference to objective criteria such as market
prices,85 invocation of norms such as fairness,86 and reliance on power
tactics such as claiming a lack of authority to agree to settlement points
beyond a particular threshold.87
Leverage can operate at the zone-definition stage and the surplusallocation stage. Parties begin bargaining only if they each have something
that satisfies at least one interest of the other. The ability to satisfy the
counterparty’s interests gives a party leverage over the counterparty. The
value of that leverage is the compensation the party can demand in
exchange for satisfying the counterparty’s interests. The minimum value is
simply the party’s reservation point, and it is determined by the available
alternatives to the negotiated agreement. In this way, leverage sets the
bargaining zone. If a party is in a position to impose a cost on the
counterparty, it can threaten to harm the counterparty if they do not agree
to particular terms, choosing to pursue their BATNA instead. In that way,
leverage can be used to establish a deal point, and may even be used to
push a deal point outside the bargaining zone.
B. Defining Positive and Negative Leverage
The distinction between positive and negative leverage is the
distinction between the ability to satisfy the other party’s interests and the
ability to impose costs on the other party in retaliation for the other party
pursuing its BATNA. In Nozick’s terms, positive leverage involves trades

83. See Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1791.
84. Id.
85. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 68, at 85; SHELL, supra note 10, at 42–43.
86. See Nancy Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 165
(Andrea K. Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006) (“Negotiators rely upon their
assessments of distributive and procedural fairness in making offers and demands . . . .”);
Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1821.
87. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 213–14.
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of productive activities, and produces voluntary exchange, while negative
leverage involves threats of unproductive activities.88
1. Positive Leverage: Consequences Rooted in Interests
Positive leverage operates through the satisfaction and refusal to
satisfy interests. A party possessing something valuable in trade can vary
proposed terms of exchange to induce the counterparty to add value to the
proposed exchange. If A possesses three items that B values, A might open
bargaining by offering only the first, and as bargaining progresses A might
propose to add the second and third in exchange for additional concessions
from B. Similarly, if B needs the items quickly, A might offer to speed
delivery in exchange for concessions. By adjusting factors such as quantity,
quality, time, price, and other conditions of exchange, A uses B’s interests
to extract value from the exchange. These are examples of positive
leverage, because they depend on A’s ability to satisfy B’s interests.
If a party has the means to satisfy the interests of another, then it also
has the power to deny satisfaction of the other’s interests. A party with
something of value can exercise positive leverage by withholding
agreement. Positive leverage can be wielded in ways that have negative
consequences for the counterparty. If B is dying of thirst and A has the only
water around, A has tremendous positive leverage over B. By withholding
the water, A can force B to give up a great deal in exchange for satisfying
B’s interest.
Which party has greater positive leverage is determined primarily by
BATNAs—the best option available to a party other than the options put
forward by a negotiating counterparty. If the thirsty B is surrounded by
water vendors, then he has many alternatives to dealing with A. He has a
good BATNA, and so A’s leverage declines. If B has shelter and A is on the
verge of dying from exposure to the sun, B has leverage over A. The extent
of his leverage depends on the extent to which A has other alternatives for
finding shelter.
Positive leverage thus operates through the intersection of interests and
alternatives. I have positive leverage if I possess something that my
counterparty wants or needs, and I have more leverage if my counterparty
has limited alternatives for satisfying that interest. I can deploy that

88. In many cases, the distinction between positive leverage and negative leverage is
roughly equivalent to the distinction between “carrots” and “sticks” in the common
negotiation metaphor. But some common examples of positive leverage, such as strikes,
appear to inflict harm on the counterparty and so do not comfortably fit within the carrotsand-sticks metaphor. To avoid confusion, I also avoid the metaphor.
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leverage by offering to satisfy my counterparty’s interests, or by
withholding satisfaction of his interests to extract concessions.
Many common negotiation strategies involve positive leverage though
they appear at first to operate through negative consequences.89 For
example, labor strikes are an example of positive leverage. When a union
negotiates with management over a collective bargaining agreement, it
negotiates the terms under which it will provide its labor to management.
Its leverage derives from its ability to satisfy the employer’s need for its
labor. A strike is simply the withholding of that labor. The power of a
strike derives from the power to withhold something the other side values.
Strikes are an example of the most elemental ways of exercising
positive leverage: patience. A negotiator with an actually or apparently
strong BATNA can simply refuse to agree until the counterparty makes
concessions. Patience is especially potent where the parties have different
time preferences. For example, where one party needs funds quickly to
satisfy some other need that party’s reservation point will diminish in value
as time passes. The other party can favorably shift the bargaining zone by
holding out and refusing to make concessions.90
Commitment tactics are another common way of exercising positive
leverage. Most commitment tactics are designed to truncate the zone of
possible agreements by establishing that the negotiator will not accept
terms worse than a particular threshold, even if some worse terms would be
superior to her reservation point. One common commitment tactic involves
emphasizing the reputational cost of agreeing to a deal that concedes a
significant portion of the bargaining zone. For example, insurance
companies sometimes refuse reasonable settlement offers even where
liability is clear, in order to gain or reinforce a reputation for intransigence
that will discourage future claims.91 In the labor relations context, a union
negotiator may pledge to his membership not to accept terms worse than a
certain benchmark, thereby committing himself to achieving that
benchmark lest he incur the wrath of the members.92 Similarly, Agents
negotiating on behalf of absent principals will often claim—either

89. See, e.g., Rebecca Ford & Mary A. Blegen, Offensive and Defensive Use of
Punitive Tactics in Explicit Bargaining, 55 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 351, 352 (1992) (describing
labor strikes as a punitive tactic).
90. See Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1810. Korobkin characterizes the use of patience
in this way as a form of commitment. Id.
91. See Jay M. Feinman, Incentives for Litigation or Settlement in Large Tort Cases:
Responding to Insurance Company Intransigence, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 189,
191–92 (2008).
92. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 68, at 142.
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accurately or falsely—to have limited authority to negotiate a deal beyond
a certain amount.93
A third method of exercising positive leverage—one that operates
much like commitment tactics—is irrationality. Like commitments,
irrationality represents an attempt to truncate the bargaining zone at a point
superior to the negotiator’s reservation point. A negotiator may convince a
counterparty that he is willing to walk away and accept an inferior
alternative by demonstrating strong emotions, such as anger.94 Emotions
may be deeply felt or feigned. Or a negotiator may simply refuse to
acknowledge the weakness of her BATNA, despite all evidence or rational
argument, to capture a greater share of the cooperative surplus than norms
of fairness or objective factors would indicate.
All of these tactics involve attempts to capitalize on positive leverage.
Their efficacy comes from changing the counterparty’s perceptions of the
value of the alternatives available to the parties. The distinguishing feature
of these uses of positive leverage is that they cannot compel a party to enter
into a deal that is worse than the party’s reservation point. They may
change a party’s perception of the value of its BATNA—thereby changing
its calculation of its reservation point—and they may lead a party to accept
a deal that concedes most or all of the cooperative surplus to the other, but
they cannot force a party to accept a deal worse than its reservation point.
This does not mean positive leverage is always benign. Negotiators
have fairly wide latitude to “bluff” and “puff” about their alternatives,95 but
misrepresentations about material facts can constitute fraud. In one
frequently cited case, a commercial landlord negotiating with a tenant over
a rent increase falsely claimed that another potential tenant was willing to
pay the requested increase and threatened eviction if the current tenant did
not agree to the increased rate.96 In this way, the landlord fabricated
positive leverage. The tenant agreed to the landlord’s terms, but later

93. See DAWSON, supra note 14, at 47. Russell Korobkin characterizes commitment
tactics as attempts to alter the bargaining zone, and thus as tactics aimed at the zonedefinition stage. Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1808. As he acknowledges, though, they can
also be understood as attempts to claim value in the surplus allocation stage. Id. at 1817
n.79. Either way, commitment tactics gain force from positive leverage: the negotiator
offers to satisfy the counterparty’s interests at a level superior to the counterparty’s
alternatives, while threatening to walk away and resort to the negotiator’s own alternatives if
the counterparty presses for additional value.
94. See Korobkin, supra note 74, at 1809.
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2012) (“Estimates of price
or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable
settlement of a claim are ordinarily [not taken as statements of material fact.]”).
96. Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 692, 692–93 (Mass. 1952).
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discovered the falsehood and sued for deceit.97 The court found the
misrepresentation actionable.98
In cases of extreme disparities in bargaining power, positive leverage
can be used in ways that impose what non-libertarians generally consider to
be unacceptable hardship on a counterparty. The example of a hospital
demanding payment from a low-income patient in dire need of care
demonstrates that point.99 The patient needs treatment and has no real
alternative to get it. His reservation point is effectively everything he can
pay. The hospital can demand that the patient exhaust his resources and it
will still be proposing a voluntary exchange because it will be offering a
benefit better than the patient’s BATNA. But society does not condone that
outcome.
This is where Westen’s normative criteria for coercion—what a party
“ought” to get—comes into play. Social norms dictate that a person in
acute need of care should get care, regardless of ability to pay. The hospital
is not acting within its rights to demand that the patient exhaust his
resources even though that option is better than the patient’s alternatives. I
return to this topic later in my discussion of the doctrines of duress and
unconscionability to show how the law protects against overreaching
deployments of positive leverage.
2. Negative Leverage: Consequences Rooted in Costs
Negative leverage, like positive leverage, is tied to the concept of
alternatives, but in a different way. Negative leverage arises out of the
ability to impose retributive costs on a counterparty if the counterparty
pursues its BATNA. In its most crude form, negative leverage could
involve a threat to do bodily harm. In my example above, A could threaten
to kill B if B does not buy A’s water instead of buying water from another
vendor. Here A’s interest is in selling his water and B’s interest is in
receiving water at the most reasonable price. A’s proposed course of
conduct—killing B—serves the interests of neither. Its sole purpose is to
impose a cost on B to discourage B from pursuing his BATNA.100

97. Id. at 693.
98. Id. at 695.
99. See Francis J. Serbaroli, The Federal “Patient Dumping” Prohibition, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 3, 1993, at 3.
100. A might also have an irrational desire to harm B. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note
77, at 166 (noting that “emotions cloud a party’s judgment and make it more difficult to
reach agreement” and that “anger, resentment, and revenge may motivate litigants more than
rationality.”). Following most negotiation models, I exclude the possibility of A’s irrational
desire to harm B from my analysis of A’s legitimate interests. See id. at 174-75 (advocating
that lawyers adopt problem-solving strategies to encourage rational value-creation).
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In practice, people use negative leverage more often than negotiation
literature tends to acknowledge. Some uses of negative leverage are
considered benign, while others raise serious moral and legal concerns.
Consider the case of Anthony Digati. Digati, a former insurance agent with
New York Life, believed he had been misled into paying $49,500 in
premiums for a variable life insurance policy he didn’t want.101 He
demanded that the company refund his premiums, and when it declined, he
decided to escalate matters. He created a website called
NewYorkLifeProducts.com, on which he attacked New York Life for
misleading the public. Then he sent a series of e-mails to New York Life
officers demanding $198,303.88, or quadruple his paid premiums. He told
the officers that if they did not pay that amount by a given date, he would
launch an e-mail spam campaign against the company, sending out two
million negative e-mails every day for three weeks.102
Digati was subsequently arrested in California, a federal magistrate
judge finding probable cause to believe he engaged in extortion.103 His
attempt at leverage failed because he crossed a relatively bright line.
Spamming of the type Digati contemplated is illegal, and so is a threat to
engage in spamming.104 But had he stopped short of his spam threat and
simply created a website on which he aired his grievances with New York
Life, he probably would have provoked little reaction from New York Life
and none from the local prosecutor’s office. Assuming he did not post false
information, posting complaints about the company would have been an
unremarkable activity. Dozens of websites exist for the sole purpose of
allowing customers to post complaints about companies. A consumer who
threatens a business with a bad review on Angie’s List unless the business
redresses a legitimate grievance has done nothing wrong, as long as the
review is not defamatory.105 If the business owner agrees to redress that
grievance to avoid the bad review, no court will void the agreement.

101. See Alison Gendar, Anthony Digati Arrested for Allegedly Threatening New York
Life with Email Spam Attack, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, March 8, 2010.
102. See Warren Richey, How a Client Tried to Extort an Insurance Giant – And
Failed, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, April 22, 2010. Digati told New York Life that if his
deadline passed without payment, his demand would increase to $3 million. “I am going to
cause you millions of dollars in lost revenue, good faith and general trust in your company,”
he said in the e-mail. “I have absolutely nothing to lose or any fear of retaliation, no judge in
the world is going to rule for a 200 billion dollar company when there is a lonely customer
that you stole from.” Id.
103. Id.
104. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CANSPAM) Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012).
105. See Shauna L. Spinosa, Yelp! Libel or Free Speech: The Future of Internet
Defamation Litigation in Massachusetts in the Wake of Noonan v. Staples, 44 SUFFOLK U. L.
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Negative leverage is a regular and unremarkable feature of labor
negotiations. I explained above why a labor strike is an example of positive
leverage—it operates by withholding the thing that the other side values. In
contrast, picketing is an example of negative leverage. The picketing is
designed to generate community pressure on the recalcitrant employer. Its
purpose is to impose an exogenous cost on the employer if the employer
resorts to its alternative, which is typically either to stop work entirely or to
employ replacement workers.
The distinguishing feature of negative leverage is its detachment from
the satisfaction of negotiable interests. Picketing is not something that the
employer desires in trade, and standing alone, it does not satisfy the union’s
interests in attaining particular working conditions. Except for the pressure
it can put on the employer, picketing serves no material purpose for the
union members, and in fact involves a cost to them (they must spend their
time walking a picket line instead of engaging in other productive activity).
At most, the picketing allows the employees to express their frustration in a
public way. Its only benefit to them—again, divorced from its potential to
influence the employer’s conduct—is the psychological benefit that union
members may feel of standing up for themselves and taking retaliatory
action, and whatever deterrent benefit they get from retribution.
A proposal employs negative leverage if the proposed conduct,
standing alone, does not serve the offeree’s interests and serves no interests
of the offeror other than (non-negotiable) psychological interests and the
deterrent effects of retribution. Consider a different picketing example
related in Getting Past No. Ury describes a negotiation in which a group of
tenants attempted to persuade their landlord to repair their broken
plumbing. When the landlord refused, the tenants picketed in front of his
suburban home, causing his neighbors to pressure him to take action to
mollify the tenants and stop the picketing.106
Ury cites this as an example of effective use of an alternative—the
tenants’ alternative to negotiating being picketing. That suggests this is an
example of positive leverage. While picketing was an ‘alternative’ for the
tenants, it was not an alternative in the BATNA sense. A BATNA is a
course of action that a party would take to satisfy her interests if she is
unable to reach agreement with the other party. It is the substitute for the
proposed agreement. In Ury’s example, the tenants’ interest is having a
place to live with working plumbing. Their alternatives for achieving that
interest include pursuing judicial or administrative processes that could

REV. 747, 754–55 (2011) (citing cases in which online reviewers have been sued for
defamation).
106. See WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO 147 (1991).
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legally compel the landlord to fix the plumbing, taking other action such as
fixing it themselves, or moving to a different building.
If the tenants had numerous other apartments available to which they
could move, or a very strong legal case, they would have good alternatives
and positive leverage. Picketing the landlord’s home, in contrast, is a
pressure tactic used in conjunction with the negotiation to compel the
landlord to reach agreement on terms favorable to the tenants. Standing
alone, it satisfied neither the landlord’s nor the tenants’ material interests.
Picketing benefited the tenants solely because it allowed them to impose a
cost on the landlord for pursuing his best alternative, which was to do
nothing. It constituted negative leverage because the leverage was rooted in
costs imposed rather than interests satisfied.
In sum, the purpose of negative leverage is to compel the other side to
agree on terms that are not dictated either by the available alternatives or by
other factors, such as charisma, fairness or objective criteria. It increases
the costs of not reaching agreement. A party may become willing to accept
terms that are worse for that party than the deal points that would otherwise
guide resolution. To the extent that negative leverage benefits the party
employing it, the benefits are psychological and/or indirect, in the form of
deterrence.
Psychological benefits are hardly unimportant. They routinely take
precedence over material interests. Game theory studies show that people
will decline material benefits when they feel they are being treated unfairly.
For example, in ultimatum games two players are offered an amount of
money. One player in the dyad is given the authority to propose a division
of the money between them. If the other accepts the proposed division,
both players get the money. But neither gets any money unless the other
agrees to the proposed division.107 In these games, people often reject a
proposed division—thereby depriving themselves and the other party of a
windfall benefit—if they feel that the proposed division is unfairly onesided.108
People often attach similar importance to retribution or revenge.109
They feel a need to punish one who they feel has harmed them, and they

107. See Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV.
753, 753 (2004).
108. See Paul Pecorino & Mark van Boening, Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum
Game, 53 J. LAW & ECON. 263, 263 (2010) (summarizing results of laboratory ultimatum
games in which recipients routinely refuse offers of less than one-third of the surplus).
109. See Noreen Stuckless & Richard Goranson, The Vengeance Scale: Development of
a Measure of Attitudes Towards Revenge, 7 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 25, 26 (1992)
(distinguishing between retribution and revenge).
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get psychological satisfaction from doing so.110 In addition to the psychic
benefits it offers through the assertion of autonomy and defense of honor,
retribution serves an important deterrent function. Retaliation in response
to an attack makes clear to both the attacker and the world that future
hostile action will entail costs for the initiator.111 Parties who fail to
retaliate against attacks may encourage further attacks, costing them in the
long run.112
Beyond immediate psychic and deterrence benefits to those who
employ them, exercises of negative leverage can have important social
benefits. “Altruistic punishment” is critical to successful human
cooperation.113 The willingness of individuals to punish others, even at a
cost to themselves, for uncooperative behavior helps to promote
cooperation generally.114 Negative leverage is not necessarily bad. In fact,
it appears to be essential in some contexts.
However, many exercises of negative leverage violate social norms
against coercion. In Westen’s terms, a person should not be left worse off
than she would have expected to be in the absence of the proposal
employing the leverage.115 So what does a party have a right to expect? At
a minimum, she has a right to expect that, at the end of the negotiation, she
will not be worse off than she would have been if the negotiation had not
taken place at all. If she had never negotiated with the other party, she
would have pursued her best available alternative. Her expectations are tied
to her BATNA. A party is entitled to expect a bargain that is no worse than
its best alternative to a proposed agreement. A party should not be coerced
into accepting a deal worse than its reservation point would be in the
absence of the costs imposed by the counterparty through the use of
negative leverage. A deployment of negative leverage that merely pressures
the counterparty to accept a deal point within the zone of possible
agreements can transgress a variety of social norms, but it does not rise to
the level of coercion.116

110. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 309 (1831) (“Every kind of
satisfaction, as it is a punishment to the offender, naturally produces a pleasure of vengeance
to the injured party.”).
111. See Ford & Blegen, supra note 89, at 352.
112. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS 29–37 (1988).
113. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE
137, 138–39 (2002).
114. Id. at 137–38.
115. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
116. See Ford & Blegen, supra note 89, at 352 (discussing offensive and defensive uses
of punitive negotiation tactics). In some situations, such as the case involving the striking
tenants, a party uses negative leverage to level the playing field against a negotiating partner
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I do not mean to suggest that a formalist algorithm built to spot
reservation points will precisely determine the moment when an exercise of
negative leverage crosses a line into inappropriate coercion. The values we
attach to our interests and alternatives are far too variable.117 Furthermore,
the concept of a stable reservation point falls apart in multi-party
negotiations.118 Particularly in commercial cases, however, reservation
points are often available in the form of market prices. Even in more
complex cases, conceptualizing limits on negative leverage in terms of
BATNAs and reservation points can help both ethical and legal evaluators
make judgments about when the use of negative leverage should be
considered illegitimate. I argue when discussing the contract doctrine of
duress that courts make these judgments, whether or not they consciously
apply this methodology.
C. The Borderland Between Positive and Negative Leverage
Because both positive and negative leverage are linked to the value of
the parties’ alternatives, many uses of leverage involve positive and
negative elements. Litigation is an example. Negotiation texts commonly
refer to litigation as a BATNA because settlement and litigation are the
alternative ways for the plaintiff to receive compensation for his injuries.119
From an economic standpoint, a litigation settlement is a sales transaction
in which the plaintiff “sells” his cause of action to the defendant.120 In
theory, the parties work out a settlement with reference to the value of the
cause of action, measured in terms of the expected recovery and the costs
of pursuing adjudication.121 The defendant can affect the costs of pursuing
adjudication by defending more or less vigorously. Since the pursuit of
who she perceives to be employing power tactics to gain a disproportionate share of the
cooperative surplus. “Fighting fire with fire” in that way would not violate the partyexpectation norm because the counterparty has no right to expect any particular outcome
within the zone of possible agreements.
117. See Noah Susskind, Wiggle Room: Rethinking Reservation Values in Negotiation,
26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 79, 88 (2011) (explaining difference between “decided” and
“revealed” reservation values). Fisher, Ury, and Patton, who created BATNA, never used
the term “reservation point,” even in their revised edition with Bruce Patton, though the
term was in wide circulation at that time. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another
View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754, 769
(1984).
118. See RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 308 (2d ed. 2009).
119. See Korobkin, supra note 16, at 868.
120. See STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 239 (2d
ed. 2007).
121. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
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litigation is the defendant’s BATNA, as well as the plaintiff’s, this is a
form of positive leverage. On the other hand, the potential exists for the
defendant to engage in litigation conduct that would be unnecessary for the
effective maintenance of its defense and pursued solely to increase the
costs to the plaintiff of pursuing litigation. This is an example of negative
leverage.122
For litigation, the line between positive and negative leverage is hazy.
A minimum level of litigation activity is both required and expected when
parties contest disputed claims. Judicial decisions are required, discovery
taken, motions filed, and experts hired and prepared. These activities cost
money for all parties. Accordingly, some reasonable litigation cost must
always be factored in when determining the “value” of the claim that is the
subject matter of the negotiation between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Simply by asserting its right to pursue a claim or defense, a party
changes the value of the cause of action being sold by the plaintiff and
bought by the defendant. Litigation activity in this sense is a form of
positive leverage. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the pursuit of
frivolous claims or defenses constitutes negative leverage. To the extent no
genuine claim or defense is at stake, settlement negotiations do not involve
anything of actual value to either party. The sole purpose of frivolous
litigation is to impose a cost on a party for pursuing its litigation
alternative.123 Much litigation conduct falls between those extremes, and it
can be difficult to tell whether litigation conduct is necessary for the
assertion of a claim or defense or is frivolous overkill. Litigation conduct in
that middle band carries elements of both positive and negative leverage.124

122. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 42 (discussing frivolous litigation as an
instance of contractual duress).
123. See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement
Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1849 (2004) (“Civil
litigants often exploit the litigation process strategically for private gain at the expense of
social welfare. One of the most troubling abuses concerns ‘frivolous’ litigation, and
particularly litigation aimed at obtaining a ‘nuisance-value settlement.’ To employ a
nuisance-value strategy, a litigant asserts a plainly meritless claim or defense in order to
extract a payoff based on the cost the other party would incur to have the claim or defense
dismissed by the court under a standard dispositive motion, like summary judgment.”) For
an examination of the incentives at work in nuisance suits, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing
Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988).
124. Counterclaims often appear to be instances of negative leverage. For example, in
the late-1990s intellectual property battle between Digital Equipment Corp., a computer
manufacturer, and Intel, a maker of processors, Digital sued Intel alleging patent
infringement. Intel counterclaimed, asserting that Digital misappropriated Intel’s
technology. It seems unlikely that Intel would have brought an independent action against
Digital for misappropriation, because that claim was tenuous at best. But asserting the
counterclaim increased Digital’s costs of pursuing its litigation alternative, conferring
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The line between positive and negative leverage can also be nebulous
in many bargaining situations outside of litigation. Richard Shell gives as
an example of effective negative leverage a bargaining ploy Donald Trump
used when he was seeking to build his Trump Tower in New York City.125
Trump needed the air rights over the building occupied by Tiffany & Co.
Tiffany did not want to sell. Trump presented Tiffany’s ownership with
two options. If granted the air rights, he promised to build an attractive
building melding with the original architecture. If he was not granted the
air rights, he claimed he would be forced by zoning regulations to build a
monstrously ugly building overshadowing Tiffany. Tiffany granted the air
rights.
If constructing the ugly building was Trump’s best alternative to the
proposal including air rights—then this was an example of positive
leverage. The proposal Trump offered was his alternative means of
satisfying his interests. On the other hand, if Trump concocted the story—if
the ugly building he described would not have satisfied his interests
because other, better options were available—it was an example of
negative leverage. The sole purpose of the proposal was to impose a cost
on Tiffany for pursuing its alternatives. Constructing the ugly building
would not benefit either Trump or Tiffany.
Though positive and negative leverage are not separated by a bright
line, the distinction is important from both a moral and a legal perspective.
Because negative leverage can be used to pressure a party to accept a deal
worse than its reservation point, negative leverage carries coercive power
that positive leverage does not. Positive leverage carries a different set of
risks, primarily the risk of abuse of power. In the next section, I will show
how the contract doctrines of duress and unconscionability have evolved to
place different legal strictures on these two types of leverage.
IV. LIMITS ON LEVERAGE IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT: DURESS AND
UNCONSCIONABILITY
As a legal matter, negotiations are regulated primarily after the fact by
contract law. Rules of professional responsibility dictate certain minimal
requirements for the conduct of negotiations—no misrepresentations of
material fact,126 no threats of criminal prosecution in the negotiation of
civil disputes127—but these rules offer very little specific guidance and
negative leverage on Intel. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 243–45 (describing
dispute between Digital and Intel).
125. SHELL, supra note 10, at 103.
126. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1983).
127. See NEW YORK RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(3) (2009).
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apply only to lawyer-negotiators. The criminal law provides some limits on
the use of threats and blackmail,128 but it leaves the vast majority of
negotiation behaviors unregulated. Negotiators typically learn their
bargaining practices violated a legal norm only when a court intercedes to
declare an agreement unenforceable—because it was reached on the basis
of fraud, mistake, duress, unconscionability, or undue influence129—or to
impose an obligation in the absence of formal agreement based on the
doctrine of promissory estoppel.130
In the law of contracts, the two doctrines that most directly regulate the
use of power in negotiation are the doctrines of duress and
unconscionability.131 In general, courts enforce contracts even where
substantial disparities in bargaining power result in one-sided
agreements.132 The doctrines of duress and unconscionability are
exceptions to that rule. They give courts a legal justification to refuse
enforcement of negotiated agreements on the basis of abusive bargaining
tactics.
The doctrines of duress and unconscionability developed separately
along parallel tracks—duress in the courts of law and unconscionability in
equity. Up through the 18th century, duress was a defense to contract only if
an agreement was coerced by threats of actual, serious physical harm, such
as imprisonment or loss of life or limb.133 Threats of less serious harms,
such as economic harms, were not grounds for relief.134 By the end of the
nineteenth century, however, courts allowed parties to escape contractual

128. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1962).
129. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 273–341 (6th ed.
2009).
130. See id. at 218–36.
131. Duress and unconscionability are by no means the only doctrines used to regulate
behavior in contract negotiation. Undue influence is another doctrine that protects weaker
parties against overreaching. See id. at 286–91. Undue influence claims typically involve
disparities in capacity, with the stronger party taking advantage of the weaker party’s
reduced capacity. They often involve special duties. For example, many legal relationships,
such as principal-agent, trustee-beneficiary, or guardian-ward, carry special obligations on
the dominant party that do not apply in arms-length transactions. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1981). I focus on duress and unconscionability because
they most directly relate to improper uses of bargaining power in arms-length negotiations
where no special duties are present.
132. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
139, 144 (2005) (“Courts rarely overturn contracts on the basis of . . . doctrines explicitly
employing inequality of bargaining power as an element, and inequality of bargaining
power alone is not a sufficient justification for judicial intervention into contract disputes.”).
133. See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 273; WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 23 (quoting
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND).
134. Id.
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agreements on grounds of purely economic duress.135 In a leading case,
Justice Holmes famously described the test of duress as follows: “If a party
obtains a contract by creating a motive from which the other party ought to
be free, and which in fact is and is known to be sufficient to produce the
result, it does not matter that the motive would not have prevailed with a
differently constituted person, whether the motive be a fraudulently created
belief or an unlawfully created fear.”136
Unconscionability emerged in equity as an all-purpose vehicle for
protection against oppressive bargains.137 The doctrines of undue influence,
misrepresentation, and mistake were initially conceived in equity as
particularized applications of a more general concept of
unconscionability.138 As these principles migrated into contract law as freestanding doctrines, unconscionability remained a hazy concept until it was
codified in the Uniform Commercial Code.139 It has since been
incorporated into the law of contracts generally.140 As the comment to
U.C.C. § 2-302 states, “The basic test is whether, in the light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under
the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.”141
135. John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C. L. REV. 237, 241 (1942).
136. Silsbee v. Webber, 50 N.E. 555, 556 (Mass. 1898).
137. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3rd Cir. 1948) (“That equity
does not enforce unconscionable bargains is too well established to require elaborate
citation.”).
138. In the 1970s, the English courts briefly attempted to fuse these various legal and
equitable doctrines—duress, unconscionability, undue influence, etc.—into a single
contractual defense based on “inequality of bargaining power.” See Barnhizer, supra note
132, at 145. In the words of Lord Denning, “[T]he English law gives relief to one who,
without independent advice, enters into a contract on terms which are very unfair or
transfers property for a consideration which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining
power is grievously impaired by reason of his own needs or desires, or by his own ignorance
or infirmity, coupled with undue influences or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the
benefit of the other.” Lloyd’s Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, [1975] Q.B. 326 (C.A.) 339 (Lord
Denning M.R.).
139. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). U.C.C. § 2-302 provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contra ct, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so
limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1977).
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
141. Professor Leff, whose analysis has shaped judicial interpretations of U.C.C. § 2302 for decades, criticized this section for its failure to adequately define unconscionability.
See Leff, supra note 139, at 487. (“If reading this section makes anything clear it is that
reading this section alone makes nothing clear about the meaning of ‘unconscionable’
except perhaps that it is pejorative.”).
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The tests of duress and unconscionability share an underlying
impulse—protecting a weaker party from overreaching by a stronger
party—but they emphasize different considerations. Duress focuses on the
reasons why the weaker party accepted a particular deal and the nature of
the threatened conduct. It requires the weaker party to prove that it acted in
fear of some unjustified action.142 Unconscionability focuses on the
relationship between the parties and the reasonableness of the bargain. It
relieves a weaker party of grossly unfair obligations where the weaker
party either did not understand the terms or had no real choice but to accept
because it had no better alternatives.143 For duress, the emphasis is on
whether the agreement was coerced; for unconscionability, the emphasis is
on whether the agreement was unfair.144
On this distinction, Alan Wertheimer offers a useful contrast between
causing the counterparty’s lack of options and taking advantage of the
counterparty’s lack of options.145 Duress requires coercion. A party
engages in coercion when it causes the counterparty’s dilemma by taking
improper action to increase the cost to the counterparty of pursuing an
otherwise available alternative. When the counterparty lacks options
because of forces beyond the control of either party, no coercion is
involved, although the party in the superior position may take advantage of
the other’s weakness in unacceptable ways. It may be unconscionable to
take advantage of another’s weakness, but it does not seem like duress.
Neither the case law nor the drafters of the Restatement maintain a
precise distinction between duress and unconscionability along the lines I
suggest because unconscionability has only crystallized as a contract law
defense in the last half-century.146 Most case law before the last few
142. See Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 120 A.2d 11, 15 (N.J. 1956) (“[D]uress is tested,
not by the nature of the threats, but rather by the state of mind induced thereby in the
victim.”).
143. See Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (describing an
unconscionable contract as one “such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.”). Id.
144. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 21–22. Consistent with court decisions prior to
the last few decades of the twentieth century, Wertheimer analyzes both contract defenses
based on improper conduct in the negotiating process and contract defenses based on the
unfairness of the resulting bargain under the rubric of duress. My argument that the former
should be placed under the rubric of duress and the latter under the rubric of
unconscionability is based on recent case law and reflect an attempt to bring logical
consistency to the doctrines.
145. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 39–40.
146. Some courts mix duress and unconscionability in the same analysis. In United
States v. Bedford Assocs., 491 F. Supp. 851, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court found a contract
voidable using this reasoning:
By misrepresenting the extent of competition, by threatening in bad faith to exercise the
second option, by misleading Bedford as to the availability of further negotiations, and by
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decades treated all contract defenses based on improper use of leverage as
duress.147 The modern development of these doctrines suggests an
understanding of the different circumstances in which leverage can be
misused that is consistent with my approach. I argue that duress is best
understood as the misuse of negative leverage and that unconscionability is
best understood as the misuse of positive leverage. A contract is void due
to misuse of negative leverage either where the threatened conduct is itself
wrongful or where a party uses negative leverage to pressure the other
party into an unfair agreement. A contract is void due to misuse of positive
leverage where a stronger party forces a party with no real alternatives to
accept an agreement that violates social norms.
A. Duress: The Improper Use of Negative Leverage
Under the doctrine of duress a party may avoid its contractual
obligations by showing it was improperly coerced into entering the
agreement.148 In the words of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, “[i]f
a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the
other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is
voidable by the victim.”149 The Restatement formulation incorporates two
key features: a party’s choices must be unreasonably constrained, and the
proposal constraining the party’s choices must be improper.
Wertheimer, analyzing the parallel language from the first Restatement
of Contracts,150 refers to these as the “proposal” prong and the “choice”
prong.151 The proposal prong recognizes that a person’s choices are often
constrained by the actions of others in legitimate ways. A person should be
able to escape the consequences of her volitional acts only when
“improper” pressure has left her with no reasonable alternatives.152 The
engaging in other wrongful acts, the Government placed Bedford in an extremely precarious
position financially and deprived Bedford of any real choice of action. Under these
circumstances, the Government’s conduct constituted duress. The Government’s wrongful
actions during the negotiations taken in conjunction with the one-sidedness of the terms of
the alleged new lease render the alleged new lease unconscionable and therefore
unenforceable.
147. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 23–28 (collecting cases raising duress defenses
from 1881–1978).
148. See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 274 (“Today the general rule is that any wrongful
act or threat which overcomes the free will of a party constitutes duress.”).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981).
150. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 492 (1932).
151. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 30 (arguing that duress as defined in the
Restatement involves a two-prong analysis that focuses on the voluntariness of the
recipient’s choices and the moral legitimacy of the proposal).
152. See id. John Dalzell makes this point when he argues that duress consists of two
necessary and sufficient elements: “1) the transaction must be induced by a wrongful threat,
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choice prong arises out of the fundamental principle of duress: a person
does not act under duress if she had reasonable alternatives to the course of
action she took, but declined to pursue them.
1. The Proposal Prong
Under the proposal prong, threats support a duress defense only if they
are “improper.” The second Restatement lists two categories of improper
threats. First, the Restatement provides that a threat is improper if the
proposed course of action is itself illegal or otherwise so shocking that no
inquiry into the fairness of the resulting bargain is required.153 Second, a
threat can be improper even if the threatened conduct is not inherently
wrongful, as long as the resulting bargain is “not on fair terms.”154
Duress of the first type seems to require analysis under the proposal
prong without consideration of the choice prong. That is true where a
proposal threatens the commission of a crime or tort, such as perpetrating
physical violence or property damage. Threats to engage in conduct that is
itself illegal or inherently improper constitute negative leverage because a
bargain based on such a threat does not constitute a voluntary exchange.
Little analysis is required to conclude that an agreement entered into under
threat of criminal conduct should not be enforced. Negative leverage that
employs such threats violates norms against coercion without the need to
evaluate the terms of the resulting bargain.155
But certain instances of the first type of duress in fact require
assessment of the terms of the deal, because they incorporate criminal laws
that depend in part on a showing of financial harm. Most notably, threats to
engage in conduct that meets the test of extortion under applicable criminal
law constitute the first type of duress.156 Extortion statutes typically require
that the threatening conduct be employed for the purpose of obtaining the
“property” of the victim.157 For example, the Hobbs Act defines extortion
as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color

2) for which the law offers no adequate remedy, that is, no remedy which (by practical
layman’s standards, not those of the common-law or even of equity) is really sufficient to
compensate for the wrong suffered if the threat should be carried out.” Dalzell, supra note
135, at 240.
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(1) (1981).
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2) (1981).
155. See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 276.
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. b (1981).
157. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1962) (“A person is guilty of theft if he
purposely obtains property of another by threatening to” engage in enumerated acts).
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of official right.”158 In United States v. Enmons,159 the United States
Supreme Court held that extortion under the Hobbs Act “consists of the use
of wrongful means to achieve a wrongful objective.”160 Even if the
threatened conduct is not itself illegal, the use of fear to obtain property
constitutes extortion when “the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim” to
the property.161
Federal courts have applied that section to assess deployments of
leverage in negotiation. In Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Icahn,162 corporate raider
Carl Icahn purchased a number of shares in Viacom and then threatened a
hostile takeover unless Viacom purchased those shares back at a price
higher than market value.163 Viacom agreed to Icahn’s terms and then sued
to recover the difference between the price it paid Icahn and the market
value.164 Noting that this sort of “greenmail” is not inherently unlawful, the
court held that “[w]hat converts otherwise lawful business activity into
‘wrongful means’ is the use of that activity to obtain property to which
defendants have no lawful claim.”165 The court used this test to distinguish
between “hard bargaining” and extortion:
In a “hard-bargaining” scenario the alleged victim has no pre-existing
right to pursue his business interests free of the fear he is quelling by
receiving value in return for transferring property to the defendant, but in
an extortion scenario the alleged victim has a pre-existing entitlement to
pursue his business interests free of the fear he is quelling by receiving
value in return for transferring property to the defendant.”166
In other words, to be deprived of “property” by “wrongful means” is to
be pressured into an agreement that concedes value that the threatened
party could not have been required to concede in the absence of the
threatening proposal. A party should not be pressured, by threats of force,
violence, or fear, into accepting a deal worse than it could have gotten by
pursuing its best alternative to an agreement with the threatening party. So
even though the Restatement indicates that proposals that are extortionate
under the relevant criminal law are improper without consideration of the
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012).
159. 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
160. Id. at 400.
161. Id.
162. 747 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
163. Id. at 207.
164. Id. at 209. Viacom sued under the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). 18 U.S.C. § 1962. To prevail under RICO, Viacom had to prove
that Icahn engaged in an illegal predicate act. Id. It alleged both securities fraud and
extortion under the Hobbs Act. Id. at 210.
165. Id. at 211–12.
166. Id. at 213 (internal citations omitted).
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fairness of the resulting deal, the test of extortion can require analysis of
the terms of the resulting deal. 167
The second type of duress provided for in the Restatement rests on
similar principles. Under that test, conduct that is not inherently wrongful is
improper if the resulting bargain is “not on fair terms.”168 This language
appears to ignore the proposal prong entirely. But in context, the
Restatement language suggests something else is intended.169 Specifically,
the section provides that the circumstances in which a bargain is not on fair
terms includes cases where “the threatened act would harm the recipient
and would not significantly benefit the party making the threat.”170 This is
a description of negative leverage. Negative leverage arises out of
proposals that impose costs on the counterparty for pursuing its alternatives
without offering any material benefit to the party making the proposal.
Negative leverage involves proposals that “would harm the recipient and
would not significantly benefit the party making the threat.”171
Duress, like its criminal counterpart, extortion, depends on a
demonstration of coercion.172 I argue that only negative leverage is

167. See Id. The court in Viacom found no extortion because the plaintiff had no right
to be free of a takeover by Icahn. “Here, plaintiff received something of value in return for
its consideration: Plaintiff’s transfer of property to defendants enabled plaintiff to receive an
eleven year standstill covenant from defendants and 3,498,200 shares of common stock,
thereby assuring that Viacom would be relieved of its fear of suffering damage caused by
the threat of a takeover by defendants.” Id. Icahn was engaging in positive leverage; there
was no coercion and no extortion.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2) (1981).
169. In practice, courts have not relied on section 176(2) to police the substantive
fairness or unfairness of agreements. See Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the
Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 443, 485 (2005). Professor Giesel describes
section 176(2) as a failed experiment for that reason. Id. If section 176(2) is understood in
the way I suggest, however, it makes sense as a description of much of the case law, even if
courts do not invoke it.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2)(a) (1981). The additional listed
grounds are where “(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of assent
is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat, or (c) what
is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.” Id. § 176(2)(b)–(c). In my
analysis, these categories are better understood as misuses of positive leverage and so are
better considered examples of unconscionability.
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 176(1) (1981).
172. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1962). Many state extortion statutes incorporate
language to the Restatement test for duress. New York’s extortion statute, for example,
provides that “a person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another
person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a
fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will” take one of nine
enumerated actions, including causing physical injury, engaging in other conduct
constituting a crime, accusing a person of a crime, or “perform[ing] any other act which
would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is calculated to harm another
person materially with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial
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coercive, and the tests for both extortion and duress are consistent with that
view. These tests require either that threatening conduct be inherently
wrongful or that it harm the threatened party without benefitting the
threatening party. Since not all uses of negative leverage are improperly
coercive—picketing and posting negative online reviews being two
commonly accepted examples—the test for duress must distinguish
between acceptable and unacceptable uses of negative leverage. This is
where the choice prong comes into play.
2. The Choice Prong
In applying the choice prong, courts historically required that the party
seeking relief demonstrate an “overborne will.”173 The problem with this
formulation is that, in the absence of physical coercion, the threatened party
manifestly made a choice to accept the proposed bargain.174 It exercised
volition in choosing among bad options. Most modern commentators,
including the Restatement, take the position that a better analysis asks
whether the threatened party had a reasonable alternative to agreement.175
Even courts nominally applying the overborne-will standard often focus on
the irrationality of the bargain. In Gallagher v. Robinson, for example, the
court defined duress as being “tantamount to compulsion which is an
impulse or feeling of being irresistibly driven toward the performance of
some irrational action.”176
Duress cases involve allegations of undue pressure put on a negotiator
to accept a particular set of terms. The threatened party accepted a
particular set of terms instead of choosing to go with its BATNA. In the
context of negotiation, a decision to accept a particular set of terms is
irrational—it is not what a reasonable person would do—when that set of
terms is worse than the negotiator’s reservation point. By definition, a
reservation point is the point at which a rational negotiator walks away
from the table because the proposed bargain is worse than the best
alternative to a negotiated agreement. The choice prong of duress captures
cases in which the threatened party agreed to terms worse than its

condition, reputation or personal relationships.” See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05 (McKinney
2012).
173. See Giesel, supra note 169, at 469–71.
174. Id. at 471.
175. See Meredith R. Miller, Revisiting Austin v. Loral: A Study in Economic Duress,
Contract Modification and Framing, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 357, 440 (2006); WERTHEIMER,
supra note 20, at 36; P.S. Atiyah, Economic Duress and the “Overborne Will”, 98 L. Q.
REV. 197, 201 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981).
176. Gallagher v. Robinson, 232 N.E.2d 668, 670 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1965).
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reservation point. In effect, the evidence of an “overborne will” is precisely
that: an agreement to terms worse than the negotiator’s reservation point.177
3. Application of the Doctrine
The doctrine of duress has been criticized for lacking consistency and
clarity.178 A coherent duress doctrine emerges if the proposal prong is
understood to capture exercises of negative leverage and the choice prong
is understood to capture agreements that fall outside the zone of possible
agreements. Duress entails negative leverage used to extract a deal worse
than the threatened party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement.
The Restatement gives the following illustration that conforms to that
understanding:
A makes a threat to B, his former employee, that he will try to prevent
B’s employment elsewhere unless B agrees to release a claim that he has
against A. B, having no reasonable alternative, is thereby induced to make
the contract. If the court concludes that the attempt to prevent B’s
employment elsewhere would harm B and would not significantly benefit
A, A’s threat is improper and the contract is voidable by B.179
The above illustration is based on Perkins Oil v. Fitzgerald,180
although the facts of Fitzgerald are slightly different. Fitzgerald was an
employee of Perkins Oil. He was injured on the job, as a result of which
injury both of his arms were amputated.181 Perkins offered him $5,000 in
compensation, which was the maximum of the company’s insurance
coverage. At the same time, Perkins threatened to fire and then blackball

177. As I suggested in discussing extortion under the proposal prong, extortion also
seems to require a showing that the threatened party agreed to terms worse than its
reservation point. See, e.g., Cooper v. Austin, 750 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). In
Cooper, during the course of a mediation, the wife sent the husband a note in which she
threatened to disclose to the police a photograph her husband had taken of a nude, and
apparently underage, woman. Shortly thereafter, the parties reached an agreement giving the
wife $128,000 of marital assets and the husband $10,000. A Florida Court of Appeals
voided that agreement, calling the wife’s threat extortion. Id. at 712. After the settlement
was consummated, the husband learned that the woman had been legal age at the time the
photograph was taken and challenged the agreement. Id. Implicit in the decision is a
conclusion that the husband would have done better had he gone forward with his litigation
alternative in the absence of the threat. Joseph Livermore argues that the most courts can do
in assessing alleged extortion in a litigation context is ask whether the settlement is worse
than the reasonably calculable value of litigation—which is to say, the reservation point. See
Joseph M. Livermore, Lawyer Extortion, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 403, 407 (1978).
178. See Giesel, supra note 169, at 463 (Commentators over the years have noted that
the courts make an absolute mess of applying the duress doctrine.).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. f, illus. 12 (1981).
180. 121 S.W.2d 877 (Ark. 1938).
181. Id. at 879.
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Fitzgerald’s father-in-law, also an employee and the family’s main breadwinner, if Fitzgerald did not accept the $5,000 offer and release Perkins
from further liability. Facing the financial ruin of his entire family,
Fitzgerald accepted the offer and signed a release. He then sued Perkins for
negligence, whereupon Perkins raised the release as a defense. The case
went to a jury, which found Perkins negligent, rejected the defense of
release, and awarded Fitzgerald $45,000.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, including the
determination that the release was executed under duress. The court
approved of the portion of the jury instructions defining duress as follows:
You are instructed that releases and contracts, to be valid, must be
voluntarily made, and, where executed under such circumstances as would
enslave the will, the release or contract is void; because consent is of the
essence of the contract or release, and where there is compulsion, there is
not consent, for this must be voluntarily.182
The jury instructions then provided that “[d]uress, by threats, exists not
wherever a party has made a release under the influence of a threat, but
only where such a threat excites a fear of some grievous wrong.”183 The
Arkansas law emphasized the overborne will of the weaker party. The
Supreme Court said virtually nothing about why Perkins’s threat to
exercise its legal right constituted duress.
Despite the lack of analysis, the facts of the case support the
conclusion that negative leverage, when used to coerce a negotiating
partner into accepting a deal worse than his reservation point, triggers a
defense of duress.184 Perkins apparently had no business reason to fire
Fitgerald’s father-in-law, who was a supervisor for the company.185
Perkins’ sole purpose in threatening to fire him was to impose a cost on
Fitzgerald for pursuing his BATNA of litigation. Further, the settlement
Perkins extracted seemed well inferior to Fitzgerald’s reservation point.
The jury returned a judgment worth almost ten times the settlement, and in
evaluating the plaintiff’s damage claim for excessiveness, the Supreme

182. Id. at 885.
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 275. Perillo notes that, while courts seldom
articulate this rationale in their decisions, the facts of the duress cases support the
proposition that duress normally requires that the threatened party agree to an unfair
bargain. “Duress will generally not be found to exist unless the party exercising the coercion
has been unjustly enriched.” Id. He cites Campbell Soup Co. v. Desatnick, 58 F. Supp. 2d
477, 482 (D.N.J. 1999) for the principle that “where there is adequacy of consideration,
there is generally no duress.” Id. In other words, duress exists only where a party has been
coerced into accepting a deal worse than its reservation point; otherwise consideration
would be adequate.
185. Fitzgerald, 121 S.W.2d at 879.
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Court expressly stated that the award was reasonable given the life-altering
injuries Fitzgerald suffered.186
In a case raising similar issues, Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson
187
Co., the plaintiffs were at-will employees of defendant Thompson. They
had purchased stock in Thompson subject to a provision that Thompson
could repurchase the stock if plaintiffs’ employment was terminated for
any reason.188 Thompson demanded that plaintiffs resell Thompson their
stock and threatened to fire them if they refused. Plaintiffs complied, but
later brought suit to rescind the sale on grounds of duress. The Seventh
Circuit held that the plaintiffs stated a claim for duress, even though
Thompson would have been within its rights to fire them for any reason.189
The court held that whether the agreement to resell the stock was the
product of duress was a question of fact, but it gave no clear guidance on
the proof required other than that plaintiffs had to show the threatened
termination “deprived them of their free will.”190
Like Fitzgerald, Laemmar appears to be an example of a negotiating
party accepting an agreement worse than its reservation point due to the use
of negative leverage by the other side. Plaintiffs and Thompson were
negotiating over the sale of plaintiffs’ stock. Plaintiffs obviously believed
the terms Thompson was offering were inferior to their reservation point.
Thompson had no real desire to fire plaintiffs, since it was happy to keep
them if it could retrieve its stock and did retain them after they agreed to
resell it. Thompson used a threat to perform an action that did not advance
its interests in order to coerce plaintiffs into accepting a deal worse than
their reservation point.
In Gallagher Drug Co. v. Robinson,191 Robinson admitted to stealing
from his employer, Gallagher.192 Robinson agreed to repay the $2,000 he
stole, apparently in exchange for an agreement not to prosecute. Robinson
paid part of the money and then refused to pay the balance, whereupon
Gallagher sued him to collect. Robinson argued that he agreed to pay the
debt under duress. The court disagreed. It defined duress as “tantamount to
compulsion which is an impulse or feeling of being irresistibly driven
toward the performance of some irrational action.” It then found that

186. Id. at 885–86. To put the numbers in perspective, $5,000 in 1935 would be roughly
$84,000 in 2012 dollars. $45,000 would be over $750,000 in 2012 dollars. Bureau of Labor
Statistics CPI Calculator, available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpicalc.htm.
187. Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1970).
188. Id. at 681.
189. Id. at 682.
190. Id.
191. 232 N.E.2d 668 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1965).
192. Id. at 670.
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Robinson “was a free agent, that he had a choice, that is, he had freedom in
exercising his will in signing the written agreement or note herein sued
upon by the plaintiff.”193
The court’s focus in Gallagher on “irrational action” is critical. A key
difference between Fitzgerald and Laemmar, on the one hand, and
Gallagher, on the other, is that the plaintiffs in Fitzgerald and Laemmar
were coerced into accepting a bargain that was worse than their reservation
point. In Gallagher, however, Robinson agreed to repay only what he
owed. Had the employer brought suit against him to recover what he stole,
that is the minimum he would have been required to pay. He was not
coerced into accepting a bargain worse than his reservation point. He did
nothing irrational.194
Cases in which courts find duress fail Nozick’s test of productive
exchange195 and meet Westen’s test of coercion.196 The employers in
Fitzgerald and Laemmar proposed actions that satisfied neither their nor
their employees’ interests, standing alone, which is to say they involved the
application of negative leverage. The resulting bargains were worse than
the employees had reason to expect, given their reservation points. In the
language of the Restatement, the employers’ proposals “did not benefit the
offeror” and “were not on fair terms.”197

193. Id.
194. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 33.
195. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
197. The Restatement cites another case fitting this pattern in an illustration relating to §
176(1)(d), which is the section dealing with inherently improper threats. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(1)(d) cmt. e, illus. 11. In the case, Wolf v. Marlton Corp.,
154 A.2d 625 (N.J. Super. 1959), a couple put down a deposit with a builder to buy a new
home, but sought to escape the contract after marital strife developed. They demanded the
return of their deposit, threatening the builder that they would sell to an undesirable
purchaser if forced to complete the transaction. The builder refused to return the contract,
but also refused to complete the sale. The purchasers sued for breach of contract to recover
the deposit. Id. at 628. The court found duress, concluding that “where a party for purely
malicious and unconscionable motives threatens to resell such a home to a purchaser,
specially selected because he would be undesirable, for the sole purpose of injuring the
builder’s business, fundamental fairness requires the conclusion that his conduct in making
this threat be deemed ‘wrongful,’ as the term is used in the law of duress.” Id. at 630.
The case is unusual, in that duress was used to defend a decision not to consummate a
contract, rather than to escape a contractual obligation. The implication of the opinion,
though, is that the builder would have acted under duress had it agreed to refund the deposit,
and that seems to be the way the Restatement uses the case. In my view, the case does not
belong in the category of inherently wrongful threats. What made this threat “wrongful” was
that it used negative leverage in an attempt to coerce the builder into accepting a deal worse
than his reservation point.

KIRGIS - MACRO RUN 2.9.14 (DO NOT DELETE)

144

Harvard Negotiation Law Review

SUN 2/9 9:39 PM

[Vol. XX:N

B. Unconscionability: The Improper Use of Positive Leverage
Because negative leverage can be coercive, it poses a special set of
concerns. Courts deal with inappropriate uses of negative leverage in
relatively consistent ways, even if they have not always recognized the
intuitions that seem to guide the decisions or used consistent terminology.
Deployments of negative leverage that involve threats of illegal conduct or
threats that coerce a party into a bargain worse than its reservation point
consistently meet judicial disapprobation.
Positive leverage does not have the same coercive power as negative
leverage. Consequently, it is less proscribed than negative leverage.
Assuming a negotiator does not make material misrepresentations and no
special duties exist, she is largely free to drive a hard bargain by holding
out for the best possible terms. She is under no legal obligation to concede
any portion of the available bargaining zone. Moreover, under most
circumstances, a negotiator can freely lead a counterparty into a “bad” deal,
in the sense of a deal worse than the counterparty’s reservation point.
Freedom of contract is a powerful current in Anglo-American law, and the
freedom to contract is understood to mean the freedom to bargain hard as
well as the freedom to enter into bad deals.198 Courts normally will not
review the adequacy of the consideration to ensure that agreements are
fair.199
An example of this principle is Remco Enterprises, Inc. v. Houston.200
A consumer with a ninth-grade education entered into a rent-to-own
agreement for a television that obligated her to pay more than twice the
retail value of the television.201 The court enforced the agreement,
emphasizing that the consumer received certain benefits from the rent-toown plan that she would not have gotten had she paid cash and that she had
read the agreement and “knew how to multiply.”202 The court noted case
198. See Ewert v. Lichtman, 55 A.2d 671 (N.J. Ch. 1947). The court enunciated a view
of leverage consistent with a robust view of freedom of contract:
Enmeshed in the entanglements of some unfortunate dilemma, many individuals and
corporations have found it imperative to buy their emancipation from an obligation which
they voluntarily assumed, or to dispose of some of their assets at a loss. Perhaps they did so
under the weight of adversity or misadventure and were thus the victims of some stress, yet
I think this court in such cases should act with supreme caution in abrogating and
countermanding such dealings. The qualities of the bargain which the litigant once regarded
as expedient and pragmatical ought not to be reprocessed by the court into actionable
duress.
Id. at 674.
199. See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 334.
200. 677 P.2d 567 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984).
201. Id. at 570.
202. Id. at 573.
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law from other jurisdictions suggesting that a contract price 2 ½ times
greater than retail value created a suspicion of unconscionability but
concluded that her deal at only twice the retail value did not “shock the
conscience” sufficiently to void the contract.203
Despite courts’ traditional reluctance to upset contractual agreements
in the absence of fraud or coercion, beginning in the nineteenth century,
courts began to void or modify contractual obligations where positive
leverage was used in an overreaching way. Because unconscionability has
been widely recognized as a contract defense at law only for a relatively
short time, the early decisions relied on a variety of other doctrines to
police unfair bargains. In Joseph Perillo’s words, “The law courts searched
for and found (even though not present under ordinary rules) failure of
consideration, lack of consideration, lack of mutual assent, duress or
misrepresentation, inadequacy of pleading, lack of integration into a written
contract or a strained interpretation after finding ambiguity where little or
no ambiguity existed.”204 The result was an incoherent body of law that has
only begun to crystallize since the codification of unconscionability in the
U.C.C..205
The U.C.C. provides that a court may refuse to enforce a contract if it
finds the contract was unconscionable at the time it was made, but it does
not precisely define unconscionability.206 Nor does the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, which contains unconscionability language modeled
on the U.C.C. provision.207 Typical judicial formulations of the doctrine
state that unconscionability may be invoked to avoid contractual liability
“only on a finding of both imperfections in the bargaining process, known
as ‘procedural unconscionability,’ and an unfairly one-sided term, referred

203. Id.
204. See PERILLO, supra note 129, at 334.
205. See Barnhizer, supra note 132, at 194 (“Since adoption of U.C.C. § 2-302 (and the
subsequent publication of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208), inequality of
bargaining power has been strongly linked with unconscionability.”).
206. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). Unconscionable contract or Term.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any term of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or it may so
limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) If it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any term thereof may be
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as
to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid
any unconscionable result.
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to as ‘substantive unconscionability.’”208 Procedural unconscionability
includes cases in which a party is unfairly surprised by the terms in the
agreement as well as cases in which the agreement was not truly
“voluntary.”209
1. Procedural Unconscionability
The “unfair surprise” form of unconscionability does not address the
misuse of leverage. These cases typically involve unsophisticated
consumers who enter into contracts of adhesion with onerous terms buried
in fine print. The problem in these cases is not that a party was forced to
agree to unfavorable terms—a use of positive leverage by the stronger
party—but that a party did not know that it was agreeing to unfavorable
terms.210 The weaker party can get relief only if it would not have agreed
had it known the terms.211 These are cases in which the straightforward
application of positive leverage would not have produced an agreement on
those terms.212
A different line of cases protects weaker parties from involuntary
agreements reached as a result of the misuse of positive leverage. Many of
the early cases used the language of duress, not unconscionability. For
example, in News Publishing Co. v. Associated Press,213 a publisher had
contracted with United Press to provide it syndicated news reports. When
United Press went out of business, the publisher had no choice but to seek
the same service from its only rival, Associated Press. Associated Press
demanded that the publisher pay $10,000 more than other publishers were
required to pay for the same service and surrender certain valuable
guarantees. With no other access to the news it needed to survive, the
publisher agreed. It then brought suit in tort against Associated Press and
its officers for an unlawful combination and conspiracy. 214 The court found

208. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1256 (2003).
209. Id. at 1257.
210. In general, courts enforce contracts of adhesion irrespective of whether the nondrafting party read them, understood them, or even knew they existed. See Id. at 1204.
211. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(c) (1981). Section 211(c)
addresses form contracts. It provides that a lack of knowledge of contract terms can indicate
lack of assent “[w]here the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term.” Id.
212. But see James J. White, Form Contracts under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L.
Q. 315, 348–49 (1997). Professor White analyzed twenty-five Arizona cases applying
Restatement section 211(c) and concluded that in many of the cases, either the terms were
not hidden or a reasonably informed weaker party would have expected them.
213. 114 Ill. App. 241 (1904).
214. Id. at 242–43.
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that Associated Press had an obligation to the public that required it to
provide its services to this publisher “upon the same terms and conditions
that it rendered like service to other newspaper publishers throughout the
country.”215 It held that the publisher was not bound by the agreement
because it had agreed to the increased rate under duress, having no real
choice but to acquiesce.216
News Publishing is emblematic of a long line of cases, most involving
common carriers, in which courts use the language of duress to describe
situations in which a party uses positive leverage to extract unfair terms.
The cases typically date from before unconscionability entered contract law
as a free-standing defense.217 In many of the cases, a utility or railroad used
its monopoly position to demand rates in excess of the amount prescribed
by law.218
The Restatement puts these cases in the category of duress. It classifies
them as examples of “the use of power for illegitimate ends.”219 The
illustrations in the comments to the rule give the following example:
A, a municipal water company, seeking to induce B, a developer, to
make a contract for the extension of water mains to his development at a
price greatly in excess of that charge to those similarly situated, threatens to
refuse to supply to B unless B makes the contract. B, having no reasonable
alternative, makes the contract. Because the threat amounts to a use for
illegitimate ends of A’s power not to supply water, the contract is voidable
by B.220

215. Id. at 251.
216. Id. at 256. “The payment by appellant and the surrender of the said guaranties, as
we think the evidence tends to show, being under duress, because of the necessities of its
business, and not voluntary, there may be a recovery, for the reason that the Associated
Press was under the same obligation to furnish to appellant news reports without
discrimination, as the railroad companies in the cases referred to were bound to carry freight
without extorting illegal and oppressive rates from the shipper.” Id.
217. In some of the early duress cases, the courts actually refer to the unconscionability
of the bargain. In Beckwith v. Guy Frisbie & Sons, the Vermont Supreme Court, in
affirming that economic pressure alone can provide a defense of duress, stated:
To make the payment a voluntary one the parties should stand upon an equal footing. Then
there is the free exercise of will, and compromise or payment is voluntary and binding. But
where one has the advantage of the other, where delay or a resort to the law is indifferent to
the one, but may produce serious loss and injury to the other, it is unconscionable to press
such advantage to the obtaining payment of unjust demands. That is extortion.”
Beckwith v. Guy Frisbie & Sons, 32 Vt. 559, 566 (1860).
218. See Newland v. Buncombe Turnpike Co., 26 N.C. 372 (1844); Mobile & M. R.
Co. v. Steiner, McGehee & Co., 61 Ala. 559 (1878); Louisville, E. & St. L. Consol. R. Co.
v. Wilson, 32 N.E. 311 (Ind. 1892).
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(c)(2) (1981).
220. Id. § 176 cmt. f, illus. 16.
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In this example, A uses positive leverage—its power to satisfy and
refuse to satisfy B’s interests. B has no alternative source for water, so A’s
leverage is very potent. But A overreached, pushing for a deal that is
patently unfair to B.
Unconscionability is a better fit than duress for these overreaching
exercises of positive leverage.221 The weaker party has not been coerced in
a moral sense. The more powerful party has taken advantage of a
vulnerability caused by external events, but it has not created that situation.
No threat of reprisal looms in the event that the weaker party chooses to
pursue an alternative to an agreement with the stronger party. In practice,
courts today are more likely to invoke unconscionability than duress when
addressing the misuse of positive leverage in cases like the old commoncarrier examples.
Under modern contract doctrine, misuses of positive leverage in these
ways can rise to the level of procedural unconscionability. An agreement
may be procedurally unconscionable where a party’s acceptance of terms
was not truly voluntary.222 Courts look at a variety of factors to assess
voluntariness: “[a] lack of voluntariness is demonstrated in contracts of
adhesion when there is a great imbalance in the parties’ relative bargaining
power, the stronger party’s terms are unnegotiable, and the weaker party is
prevented by market factors, timing or other pressures from being able to
contract with another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from
contracting at all.”223
Associated Press v. Southern Arkansas Radio Co.224 presents a factual
scenario strikingly similar to the one in News Publishing, but relies on
unconscionability rather than duress. The owner of a small radio station in
Arkansas had a contract with United Press International to supply it with
syndicated news.225 When UPI stopped doing business in Arkansas, the
station had no choice but to go to Associated Press. Under the terms of the
agreement Associated Press demanded, the station was liable for exorbitant
221. Basing his analysis primarily on English common law rather than U.S. law,
Professor John Phillips has also argued that many forms of duress are better understood as
instances of unconscionability. See John Phillips, Protecting Those in a Disadvantageous
Negotiation Position: Unconscionable Bargains as a Unifying Doctrine, 45 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 837, 849–52 (2010).
222. Alternatively, procedural unconscionability can arise from unfair surprise. See
Bank of Indiana, Nat’l. Ass’n. v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109–10 (S.D. Miss. 1979)
(“The indicators of procedural unconscionability generally fall into two areas: (1) lack of
knowledge, and (2) lack of voluntariness.”).
223. Id. See also Korobkin, supra note 208, at 1258–69 (analyzing factors including
adhesive nature of contracts, unequal bargaining power, lack of sophistication, and unfair
surprise).
224. 809 S.W.2d 695 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991).
225. Id. at 695.
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“lost revenues” in the event of a breach.226 The station ultimately breached
the contract and Associated Press sued to recover its lost revenues. The
court held that the lost revenue term was unconscionable and
unenforceable, concluding that “[t]he agreement is a preprinted form; the
provision relating to loss of future revenue is harsh in its operation; the
contract was signed at a time when the [station] was already in default
under its terms; and there appears to be a substantial disparity in the
relative bargaining power of the parties.”227
The key consideration in cases of this type is the presence (or absence)
of meaningful alternatives.228 A party can lack meaningful alternatives
either because it is dealing with a monopolist, as in the common-carrier
cases, or because situation-specific circumstances limit its options.229 In
Sosa v. Paulos,230 the defendant doctor performed knee surgery on the
elderly plaintiff. Less than one hour before the surgery, after the plaintiff
had been dressed and prepped for the procedure, she was presented with a
“Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreement” requiring her to consent to
arbitration of any claims arising out of her care.231 She signed the
agreement and later brought suit against the doctor for medical malpractice.
The court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on grounds of
unconscionability. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not enter into
the agreement voluntarily, emphasizing the timing and finding that the
plaintiff felt “rushed and hurried.”232 The court held that “[u]nder these
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the arbitration agreement was
negotiated in a fair manner and that the parties had a real and voluntary
meeting of the minds. Nor can we conclude that Ms. Sosa had a meaningful
226. Id.
227. Id. at 697.
228. See Barnhizer, supra note 132, at 202–08. Barnhizer separates out “meaningful
alternatives” and “opportunity for negotiation” as separate tests of oppressive bargaining
power. Id. at 201–02. But he also notes that courts conflate the distinction. Id. at 208. In my
view, the distinction is does not convey a genuine difference, and that is why courts appear
to conflate the two concepts. Parties lack a meaningful opportunity to negotiate because
they lack meaningful alternatives to a negotiated agreement.
229. See Korobkin, supra note 208, at 1264. Korobkin describes a situation-specific
monopoly in these terms: “In the typical situation, a seller operating in a competitive
environment publicizes a product’s price and/or some other visible features, which
encourages a potential buyer to make an investment in time or money in preparing to
purchase the product. Then, after the buyer’s investment of time or money has been made,
the seller presents a set of adhesive form terms that the buyer must sign or forfeit his initial
investment.” Id.
230. 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996).
231. Id. at 359.
232. Id. at 362–63. The court found the agreement substantively unconscionable
because it would have required her to pay the doctor’s legal expenses if he prevailed in the
arbitration. Id. at 362.

KIRGIS - MACRO RUN 2.9.14 (DO NOT DELETE)

150

Harvard Negotiation Law Review

SUN 2/9 9:39 PM

[Vol. XX:N

choice with respect to signing the agreement.”233 With surgery imminent,
Sosa did not have a realistic option of seeking care from another medical
provider. The lack of a meaningful alternative was sufficient to show
procedural unconscionability.
2. Substantive Unconscionability
These cases involve situations in which a stronger party imposes terms
on a particularly vulnerable counterparty. The weaker party acquiesces
because it believes it has no other way of meeting its needs. The weaker
party did not agree to a deal worse than its perceived reservation point:
because of a lack of good alternatives, it simply has a very poor reservation
point.234 Although courts speak about a lack of voluntariness, there is no
coercion in a moral sense.235 The wrong these cases seek to redress is the
use of bargaining power to impose unfair terms. For an exercise of leverage
to be sufficiently unconscionable to void a contractual obligation, it must
be coupled with an agreement that is substantively unconscionable.
Substantive unconscionability has been couched in a variety of ways.
In one widely-cited early case interpreting U.C.C. § 2-302, the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit described substantive
unconscionability in these terms:
In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary concern must
be with the terms of the contract considered in light of the circumstances
existing when the contract was made. The test is not simple, nor can it be
mechanically applied. . . . Corbin suggests the test as being whether the
terms are “so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores
and business practices of the time and place.”236
That sounds like an attempt to define a standard for the application of
Peter Westen’s “ought” criterion for overreaching exercises of leverage.237

233. Id. at 363.
234. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). In
Henningsen, one of the seminal unconscionability cases, the plaintiff’s wife was injured in a
car accident. The plaintiff had purchased the car under a standard form sales contract
promulgated by the Automobile Manufacturer’s Association and used by all the major
manufacturers. Under the agreement, the manufacturer’s liability was limited to replacement
of defective parts. Id. at 78–79. The court held the agreement unconscionable because of the
“gross inequality of bargaining position” between the parties and the absence of a
meaningful opportunity to find better warranty terms with other manufacturers. Id. at 87.
235. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 20, at 233. Wertheimer refers to these cases as
involving “hard choices” rather than coercion.
236. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Section 2-302 was not yet in effect in Washington, D.C. at the time of the decision, but the
court applied the statutory test. See Leff, supra note 139, at 551.
237. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
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Whether coerced or not, there are certain ways people ought to be treated in
a just society. Courts allow parties to drive hard bargains up to the point at
which the resulting bargain is so unfair that it violates broadly accepted
social norms. Not surprisingly, it is exceedingly difficult to find language
that precisely delineates the outer limits of hard bargaining. In the years
since § 2-302 was adopted, no single test of substantive unconscionability
has emerged.238 Instead, courts use imprecise terms to label agreements
that they deem inappropriate, describing them as “overly harsh,” “onesided,” or “shocking to the conscience.”239 That degree of specificity is
probably the most that can be expected.
C. Borderland Cases: The Contract Modification Problem
Thus far, I have deliberately avoided the class of cases that has most
bedeviled courts and fueled scholarly criticism of duress and its offshoots:
cases involving threats to breach a contract unless a party in a
disadvantaged position agrees to new terms more favorable to the stronger
party. In these cases, circumstances leave the weaker party dependent on
the stronger party, whereupon the stronger party refuses to fulfill its
existing contractual obligations absent a new promise of additional
compensation. These cases involve parties who take advantage of a
situation rather than creating it, and they involve the refusal to satisfy
interests rather than the imposition of some exogenous cost. In addition, the
weaker party accepts the proposed modification precisely because that is a
better option than its alternatives of finding other bargaining partners or
seeking compensation for the breach. For these reasons, the cases appear to
be exercises of positive leverage. But courts and commentators tend to treat
them as examples of duress.
Probably the most famous case of this type is Alaska Packers’ Ass’n.
v. Domenico.240 In Alaska Packers’, a group of fishermen contracted with
Alaska Packers to fish for salmon at a wage of $50 for the season plus two
cents for each salmon caught. Once the fisherman arrived in Alaska at the
start of the season, they refused to work unless Alaska Packers agreed to
pay them $100 for the season plus two cents for each salmon. With the
fishing season about to begin, Alaska Packers had no time to recruit new
fisherman or to go to court to compel its recalcitrant group to work at the
agreed rate. So Alaska Packers agreed to the $100 demand. At the end of
the season, the company refused to pay anything beyond the original
amount and the fishermen brought suit to recover the difference. The Ninth
238.
239.
240.

See Korobkin, supra note 208, at 1273.
See id.
117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
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Circuit held that the revised contract was not enforceable: “[T]he party who
refuses to perform, and thereby coerces a promise from the other party to
the contract to pay him an increased compensation for doing that which he
is legally bound to do, takes unjustifiable advantage of the necessities of
the other party.”241 The court did not use the term duress, justifying its
decision instead on the absence of consideration. Modern scholars, led by
Richard Posner,242 have characterized the decision as one applying duress,
and a number of cases cite it in holding that the use of positive leverage can
constitute duress where a party exploits a temporary monopoly (as the
fisherman had over Alaska Packers) to extract concessions not warranted
by any changed circumstances.243
The contract modification cases in the Alaska Packers’ line are
difficult because the existence of an agreement, and with it the obligation to
satisfy the interests of the other party through performance, complicates the
leverage calculus.244 Alaska Packers had a legal right to expect the seamen
to fulfill their contractual obligations. To the extent the seamen had an
alternative to performance, it was to breach the contract, which they had no
legal right to do. Thus, their threatened conduct—breaching the agreement
by refusing to work—seems less like an exercise of positive leverage than
appears at first glance.
In the absence of changed circumstances, their proposal did not appear
to involve a voluntary exchange in Nozick’s terms. Again assuming that
circumstances did not change for the seamen in Alaska Packers’, their
refusal to work absent a pay increase was purely opportunistic. They had
no reason to refuse to work except to exploit the weak position of Alaska
Packers. Stuck in Alaska and without other employment opportunities
readily available, they stood more to gain from working than not working.
Neither they nor Alaska Packers stood to gain from their remaining idle,
and they had no right to demand additional compensation for performing
the pre-existing agreement. Alaska Packers could legitimately feel coerced,
even though the resulting bargain was better than its alternative of
foregoing the voyage and suing the seamen for breach.
241. Id. at 102.
242. See Trompler, Inc. v. NLRB, 338 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2003).
243. See also John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C. L. REV. 237, 258
(1942).
244. See also Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971).
Loral is a favorite of contracts textbook authors. It involved a government contractor whose
subcontractor refused to deliver parts unless the contractor agreed to price increases and
additional orders. The contractor acquiesced because it could not find another subcontractor
to supply the parts in time to meet its deadline. The New York Court of Appeals voided the
modification on duress grounds. Loral is another case in which the modification was not
justified by any change in circumstances.
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On the other hand, if circumstances had changed, the analysis might be
different. Assume conditions at sea turned out to be much worse than the
parties initially expected. The seamen might rationally conclude that the
contemplated work was not worth the risks involved, and that their interests
would genuinely be served by refusing to work and accepting whatever
costs they would bear by way of Alaska Packers’s breach of contract
lawsuit.245 In that scenario, the demand for a wage increase would arguably
be productive in Nozick’s sense, because it would compensate them for
pursuing an interest that breach would have satisfied.
Most of the modern commentary on contract modification argues that
changed circumstances can justify a threatened breach.246 At least some
courts have adopted that view.247 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
adopts that test as well, stating that “[a] promise modifying a duty under a
contract no fully performed on either side is binding (a) if the modification
is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties
when the contract was made. . . .”248
Changed circumstances also change the nature of the leverage
involved. Where changed circumstances mean that a party is better off
breaching and accepting the consequences of breach than performing, the
threat of breach is a noncoercive exercise of positive leverage. In such a
case, the renegotiated terms should be enforced. But when the threat of
breach is merely opportunistic, and breach is not in the threatening party’s
interests, the threat has elements of both positive and negative leverage and
is much more coercive. Consequently, the renegotiated terms should not be
enforced. Whether courts use the rubric of duress or that of
unconscionability to justify the refusal to enforce the modified terms is less
important than that they focus on the coercive force of the leverage used to
extract the modification.249
245. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L REV. 717,
757 (2005). The authors argue that the seamen’s refusal to work absent greater
compensation may have been justified, based on speculation that they had been misled about
prevailing wages and the working conditions they could expect. Id.
246. See Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic
Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
335, 339–40 (1993); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: Ana Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 308 (1992); Richard
A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 422–23
(1977).
247. See Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 636 (R.I. 1974).
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981). See also U.C.C. §2-209 cmt.
2 (1977) (providing that “matters such as a market shift, which makes performance come to
involve a loss,” may provide a reason for a modification).
249. A powerful economic argument can be made for focusing on changed
circumstances. See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 245, at 753–54. The reason is that
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D. Leverage and the Law of Contract: Concluding Thoughts
I have shown that courts assessing claims of overreaching leverage
focus on the same considerations that underlie social proscriptions against
coercion. Courts generally enforce parties’ bargains where there is no
evidence of misrepresentation, subterfuge, or diminished capacity to
indicate that a party did not truly understand what it had agreed to.250 There
are exceptions, however, that turn on two factors: the nature of the
proposals that led to the agreement and the terms of the resulting bargain.
Where a proposal consists of inherently wrongful conduct, such as a
threat of illegal action, the resulting terms are largely irrelevant. A party
does not act within its rights when it engages in illegal conduct, so an
agreement reached as a result of such a threat cannot be enforced. Those
are rare and uninteresting cases.
Where threatened conduct is not inherently wrongful, the first step in
determining whether an agreement procured as a result is enforceable is to
ask whether the proposal involves negative leverage, with the concomitant
risk of coercion. A proposal involves negative leverage if the threatened
conduct benefits neither the proposing party nor the counterparty. Because
not all uses of negative leverage are inappropriate, however, a thorough
analysis must continue. An agreement reached as a result of the application
of negative leverage is voidable only if the resulting terms are worse than
the threatened party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement. The best
practical evidence that negative leverage was employed is when a party
agreed to terms worse than its best alternative. Positive leverage cannot
force a party into an agreement worse than its BATNA, so if a party agreed
to terms worse than its reservation point, negative leverage must have been
used.
If the proposal involves positive rather than negative leverage, the
agreement is presumed valid and enforceable. Positive leverage cannot
coerce. Positive leverage can be used to take advantage, however, and
under some circumstances positive leverage is used to extract agreements
that violate social norms to such a degree that they are voidable. The legal
tests for when an agreement is unfair to the point that it is unenforceable
the threatened party should be given the option of accepting modified terms in order to
procure performance, since that may be the best option available. If the law will not enforce
the modified bargain, then the threatening party will simply walk away, leaving the weaker
party stranded. But that is a risk only where the threatening party has a genuine incentive to
breach and accept the consequences. Id.
250. These cases are beyond the scope of my analysis because they do not involve the
use of leverage to procure an agreement. The leverage in these cases is hidden or fabricated.
The bargain is suspect because one party claims it would not have acquiesced had it not
been misled.

KIRGIS - MACRO RUN 2.9.14 (DO NOT DELETE)

Season 201x]

Desktop Publishing Example

SUN 2/9 9:39 PM

155

are notoriously imprecise. In the absence of deception, trickery, or
diminished capacity, only the rare agreement will succumb under the
applicable standards. Parties are largely free to use positive leverage to
drive hard bargains that produce one-sided deals.
Beyond clarifying the relationship between leverage and coercion and
the role leverage plays in judicial decisions regulating contract
negotiations, my goal was to demonstrate how two related contract
doctrines, duress and unconscionability, can be applied more consistently if
they are understood to address negative and positive leverage, respectively.
A more nuanced concept of leverage may be of value in understanding and
applying other legal doctrines beyond the scope of this work, like claims of
prosecutorial abuse in plea bargaining.251
V. CONCLUSION
As the first federal budget battle of 2013 lurched from winter into
spring, Congressional Republicans backed away from the debt ceiling
stand-off and turned their attention to the package of budget cuts known as
the sequester.252 The sequester, enacted as part of the 2011 budget deal,
stipulated across-the-board cuts in discretionary spending, on everything
from after-school programs to defense.253 Both parties had agreed on the
package of sequestration cuts because they believed that the threat of
across-the-board cuts would force them to negotiate for a more rational
package of cuts that might better satisfy the interests of each.254 When the
sequestration cuts came due, however, the two sides dug in again. President
Obama demanded further increases in revenue and Congressional
Republicans refused to contemplate any tax changes that would bring in
more revenue. The cuts went into effect.255
President Obama continued to blame Republicans for the impasse, but
he used very different language than when he attacked Republicans over
the debt-ceiling threat. He described the sequester as “not smart” and
accused Republicans of being out of touch with middle class voters.256 He
predicted dire consequences, which he sought to lay at Republicans’
251. See generally, H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The
Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U.L. REV. 63 (2011).
252. See Doyle McManus, The GOP’s Tactical Retreat, THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, Jan.
27, 2013, at A20. Republicans quietly agreed to suspend the debt ceiling for five months. Id.
253. See Jonathan Tamari, Congress Seems Resigned to Sequestration, THE
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 3, 2013, at A1.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Paul Harris, US faces huge job losses as Obama orders $85bn cuts, THE
OBSERVER, Mar. 2, 2013, at 29.
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feet.257 But he did not charge anyone with hostage-taking or using leverage
inappropriately.
The difference in the characterization of the debt-ceiling threat and the
sequester intransigence reflects differences in the types of leverage
employed. The threatened refusal to raise the debt ceiling constituted
negative leverage—neither side would have benefited. The sole purpose
was to impose a cost on the President—really a cost on the entire
government—for refusing Republican demands on budget cuts. That is
why it appeared coercive and why President Obama could credibly charge
Republicans with hostage-taking. But Republicans were acting within their
rights when they chose their alternative—the sequester—to agreeing to
further tax increases. They were exercising positive leverage. Not
coincidentally, the President’s attacks focused on the reasonableness of the
Republicans’ proposals.
I’ve analyzed the uses and limits of leverage in negotiation by
measuring different forms of leverage against the yardstick of coercion. I
have shown how social norms against coercion can be explained in
negotiation terms, and have used these insights to help elucidate some
common but problematic legal categories. Identifying an exercise of
leverage as positive or negative, however, does not answer the question of
whether that use of leverage is good or bad. Negative leverage can be used
in appropriate ways and positive leverage can be used in inappropriate
ways. Ultimately, those assessments are grounded in social norms that are
not easily defined. But a better understanding of the forms and uses of
leverage can help negotiators and courts think more clearly about why
certain uses of leverage seem to cross social and legal boundaries.

257.

Id.

